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Lopez Torres v. N. Y. State Board ofElections
(06-766)
Ruling Below: (Lopez Torres v. New York State Board of Elections, 462 F.3d 161 (2nd Cir.
2006), cert granted, 127 S.Ct. 1325, 167 L.Ed.2d 72, 75 USLW 3417, 75 USLW 3435).
Lopez Torres, who sought the Democratic nomination for New York Supreme Court Justice on
several occasions, found that the "burdens and barriers to organizing such [delegate] campaigns
are truly insurmountable" for those candidates who lack the "county party leaders' backing."
Faced with those barriers in her 1998 campaign for Supreme Court Justice, she realized "that
[she] had no realistic chance" to fulfill the primary election balloting requirements despite her
substantial public support. Accordingly, she "ended [her] bid for the [Democratic] nomination"
for Supreme Court Justice. She contends that the election procedures-such as petition-signature
requirements and a purely ceremonial election-are un-democratic and encourage cronyism.
Questions Presented: (1) Did the Second Circuit run afoul of American Party of Texas v. White,
415 U.S. 767 (1974) by mandating a primary in lieu of a party convention for the nomination of
candidates for New York State trial judge? (2) What is the appropriate scope of First
Amendment rights of voters and candidates within the arena of intraparty competition, and
particularly where the State has chosen a party convention instead of a primary as the nominating
process? (a) Did the Second Circuit err, as a threshold matter, in applying this Court's decision in
Storer v. Brown. 415 U.S. 724 (1974) and related ballot access cases, which were concerned with
the dangers of "freezing out" minor party and non-party candidates, to internal party contests?
(b) If Storer does apply, did the Second Circuit run afoul of Storer in holding that voters and
candidates are entitled to a "realistic opportunity to participate" in the party's nomination process
as measured by whether a "challenger candidate" could compete effectively against the party-
backed candidate?
Margarita LOPEZ TORRES, et al
Plaintiffs, Appellees
V.
NEWYORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, et al
Defendants, Appellants
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
Decided August 30. 2006
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]
STRAUB, Circuit Judge: This case requires us to peer inside New York
State's political clubhouses and detenmine
whether party leaders have arrogated to
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themselves a choice that belongs to the
people. The task falls to us by way of
interlocutory appeal. Specifically, defendants-
appellants appeal from the grant of a
preliminary injunction by the District Court
for the Eastern District of New York (John
Gleeson, Judge).
In its opinion and order, the District Court
found a clear likelihood that New York
State's process for nominating Supreme Court
Justices violates the First Amendment rights
of plaintiffs-appellees, who consist of judicial
candidates, Republican and Democratic voters
from across the state, and the non-profit group
Common Cause/NY. Accordingly, the Court
preliminarily enjoined defendants-appellants
New York State Board of Elections and its
commissioners from enforcing the statutory
provisions that regulate the nominating
process. Although the Court declined to order
the State Legislature to enact a new
nominating system, it required that
nominations for the office of Supreme Court
Justice proceed by primary election until the
Legislature enacts a new scheme of its own
accord. The District Court then stayed its
order until after this year's election cycle,
scheduled to conclude in November.
. . . We hold that the District Court acted
within its allowable discretion on all
scores....
I. New York State's Electoral Scheme
In the countiy's other 49 states, the term
"Supreme Court Justice" might signify a
member of the highest appellate court. In
New York, however, that term denotes a
judge of the State's general jurisdiction trial
court. Apart from peculiar terminology, New
York employs a method of selecting its
Supreme Court Justices that is unique in the
nation.
... Instead, it enacted a three-part scheme that
combines a primary election, a nominating
convention, and a general election. During the
first phase, the State holds a primary election
at which rank-and-file party members elect
judicial delegates. N.Y. Elec. L. §§ 6-106,
-124. Next, those delegates attend a
convention at which they select their party's
nominees. N.Y. Elec. L. §§ 6-106, -124, -158.
The individual so chosen automatically
receives a place on the general election ballot.
N.Y. Elec. L. § 7-116(1). Last, the State holds
a general election at which Justices are
elected. N.Y. Elec. L. § 8-100(1)(c).
A. The Primary Election
A network of district lines defines the primary
election battlefield. Each judicial candidate
stands for election in a particular judicial
district. New York currently is divided into 12
judicial districts. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 6(a),
(b). In turn, each judicial district encompasses
several other smaller political subdivisions
known as assembly districts. Because judicial
districts are so large, each one comprises at
least nine assembly districts and as many as
24....
As noted above, judicial candidates do not run
in the primary election themselves. Instead,
they have the option of assembling a slate of
delegates to run on their behalf, with an eye
toward placing those delegates at the judicial
nominating convention so that they can cast
their votes in favor of the candidate with
whom they are affiliated. N.Y. Elec. L. §§ 6-
106, -124. This entire slate of delegates,
however, does not run for election as one
group across the entire judicial district.
Instead, small subgroups of delegates stand
for election within each assembly district
comprising the larger judicial district . N.Y.
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In this fashion, the primary
of a series of contests
of delegates within each
New York allows each political party to
determine how many delegate slots to allot
per assembly district, but requires that this
number "be substantially in accordance with
the ratio, which the number of votes cast for
the party candidate for the office of governor,
on the line or column of the party at the last
preceding election for such office, in any unit
of representation, bears to the total vote cast
at such election for such candidate on such
line or column in the entire state." N.Y. Elec.
L. § 6-124....
To appear on the primary ballot, the delegates
must circulate designating petitions within the
assembly district in which they are running.
Within a span of 37 days, each slate of
delegates must gather 500 valid signatures
from party members residing in that assembly
district. N.Y. Elec. L. §§ 6-134(4). -136(2)(i),
(3). Each party member may sign only one
petition. N.Y. Elec. L. § 6-134(3).
Consequently, the number of available
signatories shrinks each time a party member
signs a designating petition.
Further, because petition signatures are
routinely and successfully challenged
pursuant to the one-petition signature rule,
among others, each delegate slate must
realistically gather between 1.000 and 1,500
signatures to gain a primary ballot position.
Taking the lower figure of 1,000 signatures
per assembly district, in order to run a full
complement of delegates, a judicial candidate
must gather at least 9,000 signatures (in the
judicial district with only nine assembly
districts) and as many as 24,000 signatures (in
the judicial district with 24 assembly
districts). In addition, because each group of
delegates runs in a different assembly district,
Elec. L. § 6-124.
election consists
between groups
assembly district.
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the signatures must be gathered from a variety
of particular subdivisions spread throughout
the entire judicial district.
Once the delegates achieve ballot status in
contested races, they may not indicate on the
ballot the judicial candidate with whom they
are affiliated. Accordingly, in order to run
delegate slates in any useful fashion, the
judicial candidate must inform the primary
electorate in each assembly district of which
delegates are pledged to her in that specific
locale....
Three current or former judges, including
plaintiff Margarita Lopez Torres, averred that
the process described above often shuts out
candidates lacking either great wealth or the
benefit of a political party's county-wide
apparatus. According to those judges, the
requirements of the process-recruiting large
numbers of delegates and alternates,
assembling different delegate slates in each
assembly district, recruiting petition
circulators, collecting several thousand
signatures, and conducting a host of localized
voter education campaigns-effectively
foreclosed their ability to access the primary
election phase.
Civil Court Judge Margarita Lopez Torres
found that the various delegate and
petitioning requirements created impossibly
high entry barriers for candidates lacking
institutional support-even for those who
possessed significant public support. Lopez
Torres was an experienced and successful
campaigner who twice won countywide
election to the Civil Court in Brooklyn-no
simple feat considering that Brooklyn
includes several million people of myriad
racial, ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic
backgrounds. In one recent election for Civil
Court Judge, she received over 200,000
votes-more than any Democratic candidate
for Supreme Court Justice received in
Brooklyn that year.
Yet Lopez Torres, who sought the Democratic
nomination for Supreme Court Justice on
several occasions, found that the "burdens and
barriers to organizing such [delegate]
campaigns are truly insurmountable" for those
candidates who lack the "county party
leaders' backing." . . .
This party leadership recruits judicial delegate
candidates, alternate candidates, and petition
circulators. The party then simply includes its
delegate candidates on the omnibus
designating petitions it circulates during every
primary election cycle, which may include
candidates for the State Legislature, lower
courts, and even Congress. In that way, the
party leadership ensures that its group of
loyal, hand-picked delegate candidates
achieves ballot status as a matter of course.
Defendants' own expert witness, New York
City Board of Elections Commissioner
Douglas Kellner, testified that the primary
system is designed to produce this remarkable
disparity between "individual"' candidates'
and party-backed candidates' ability to
compete. . . .
The process of running a slate of delegates on
the primary election ballot is so beset with
obstacles that nearly all candidates recognize
the attempt as a fool's errand and do not even
try. In the normal course, only one slate of
delegates-that supported by local party
leadership-even files a designating petition.
The uncontested slate is then "deemed
elected" by operation of law and does not
appear on the primary ballot. This kind of
invisible, automatic "election" is the norm
rather than the exception. Between the years
1999 and 2002, four of the State's counties-
Albany, Nassau. Suffolk, and Tompkins-did
not field one single contested delegate race in
any of their assembly districts.
B. The Delegate Lobbying Period
Political parties hold their judicial nominating
conventions one to two weeks after the
judicial delegates are elected. N.Y. Elec. L.
§§ 6-124, -126, -158(5). During that interim
period, any Supreme Court Justice aspirant,
whether or not she sought to have delegates
elected at the primary election, theoretically
may lobby the delegates for support.
However, the evidence established that for
two reasons, a candidate who lacks the
support of her party's leadership has no actual
opportunity to lobby delegates.
First, the time frame for lobbying delegates is
unrealistically brief. In contested delegate
elections, candidates have only two weeks to
lobby at least 64 delegates and as many as
248, depending on the judicial district in
which they were running....
More importantly, delegates do not exercise
their own judgment when deciding which
candidate to support. Instead, they endorse the
choice of the entity with which they are
affiliated and to which they are subject. ...
. . . As to the Ninth Judicial District, a
longtime judicial delegate averred that
because it is "practically impossible" for a
candidate to field her own slate of delegates,
"county party leaders control the selection of
delegates and alternates to the convention."
Thus, a candidate's "only path [to the
nomination] is to obtain the support of his or
her county Party chairman and then seek the
blessing of the Westchester County
chair." . . .
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. . . [T]he party leadership possesses the
power to doom a delegate's political career if
she should reject its choice for Supreme Court
Justice. Assemblymember Herman "Denny"
Farrell, who is a district leader, chairman of
the New York County Democratic
Committee, and State Democratic Party
chairman, testified of judicial delegates that,
"No one wants to get me angry, so they will
not go against me until they have nothing to
lose.". . .
The District Court also found that county
leaders do not have to issue explicit
commands to control the manner in which
delegates vote. Defense expert Kellner
conceded that at least in some judicial
districts, the "leadership of the party . . .
hold[s] a meeting before the convention" to
"work things out," and then makes
nomination "recommendations" to the
delegates. Asked whether those
"recommendations" were "always followed,"
Kellner replied, "Generally, yes." . . .
C. The Nominating Conventions
The evidence showed that the conventions
were perfunctory affairs at which no debate
occurred. Minutes from conventions held
statewide between 1990 and 2002 show that
over 96 percent of nominations went
uncontested. The overwhelming majority of
nominations were by unanimous voice vote.
From the record, it appears that a convention
chair never has been challenged
successfully....
D. The General Election
The final phase of the judicial electoral
process is the general election. Empirical
evidence showed that because one-party rule
is the norm in most judicial districts, the
general election is little more than
ceremony....
E. The Candidacy of Margarita Lopez Torres
[Lopez Torres originally won election as a
Brooklyn Civil Court Judge in 1992. After
her election, two high ranking committee
members, Norman and Vito, directed her to
hire someone of their choosing for her law
secretary. Lopez Torres interviewed him and
contacted his prior employer, another judge,
who said that the prospective law secretary
spent much time doing political work rather
than his job. Lopez Torres hired someone
else, to which both Norman and Vito
responded angrily, saying she would never
receive their support if she wanted to be a
Supreme Court Justice. A few years later,
Lopez Torres told Norman that she intended
to run for Supreme Court Justice and he
declined to support her, in fact, urging her to
withdraw. Lopez Torres found that if she
were to run her own slate of judicial
delegates, it would be impossible as a
practical matter. She eventually withdrew
from the election. Four years later, the same
course of events transpired. In 2003, she
attempted to run, yet again, without
committee support, yet again. Her delegates
were denied the opportunity to nominate her
at the convention.]
After studying Supreme Court elections for
six years, the Fund for Modem Courts
concluded that "the selection of Supreme
Court justices in New York, is, by and large, a
process controlled not by the voters but by
political leaders." "[T]he nomination, not the
election, is the lynchpin of the judicial
selection process," the Fund set forth. ...
II. Procedural History
In March of 2004, plaintiffs brought suit
against the New York State Board of
Elections and its commissioners pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that New York's
electoral scheme violates the First and
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Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution. In particular, plaintiffs claim
that the system described above violates the
First Amendment's guarantee of political
association as to Supreme Court Justice
candidates and the voters wishing to support
them. Plaintiffs also claim that the scheme
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because it places
unequal burdens on the right to vote.
In their complaint, plaintiffs sought a
declaration that the provisions of state law
providing for the electoral scheme described
above, see N.Y. Elec. Law §§ 6-106, -124,
-158, are unconstitutional. They also sought
an injunction requiring the State Legislature
to enact a new election scheme, and in the
meantime requiring the State to conduct direct
primary elections for the office of Supreme
Court Justice. In June of 2004, plaintiffs
formally moved for that relief.
Shortly thereafter, the District Court granted
motions to intervene permissively by
defendants New York County Democratic
Committee, New York Republican State
Committee, Associations of New York State
Supreme Court Justices in the City and State
of New York, and the State Association's
President, Justice David Demarest. The
District Court also granted a motion to
intervene statutorily by Attorney General
Eliot Spitzer.
In late 2004 the District Court held a 13-day
hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction, during which it admitted the
evidence set forth above. In January of 2006,
the Court issued a Memorandum and Order
granting plaintiffs' motion on First
Amendment grounds without considering
plaintiffs' equal protection claim. See Lopez
Torres v. N. Y. State Bd. of Elections, 411 F.
Supp. 2d 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
In concluding that plaintiffs demonstrated a
clear likelihood of success on their First
Amendment claim, the District Court made
the factual findings described above. In
summary, the Court found that (1) it was
"virtually impossible" for a candidate lacking
the support of the county party to field slates
of delegates; id. at 221; (2) county leaders
and district leaders "select the delegates and
alternate delegates, who, without consultation
or deliberation, rubber stamp the county
leaders' choices . . . for Supreme Court
Justice," id. at 223; and (3) county leaders and
district leaders need not issue express
commands to control the manner in which
delegates vote, id. at 224. Ultimately, the
District Court found that "Democratic and
Republican Party leaders select the
nominees," id. at 231, and that the general
election is a mere "formality" at which the
party leaders' selections are confirmed, id. at
230-31.
In light of those findings, the Court concluded
that the electoral system effectively excluded
candidates from the nominating process and
thus severely burdened voters' and
candidates' First Amendment right of
association. Applying strict scrutiny . . . the
Court assumed that all of [defendants']
interests were compelling, but concluded that
the electoral system was not narrowly tailored
to serve any of them. Id.
The Court thus enjoined defendants from
enforcing N.Y. Elec. Law §§ 6-106. Based on
a provision of state election law providing for
primary elections as the default nominating
process, the Court ordered that the State shall
conduct primary elections for the office of
Supreme Court Justice until the Legislature
enacts a new election scheme. Id. at 255-56;
N.Y Elec. L. § 6-110. . . Defendants
appealed the District Court's January 2006
order, and upon the motion of all parties, we
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set an expedited briefing schedule.
DISCUSSION
We first address the District Court's ruling on
plaintiffs' First Amendment claim, and then
the District Court's choice of remedy.
I. The District Court Did Not Exceed Its
Allowable Discretion in Concluding that
Plaintiffs Demonstrated a Clear Likelihood of
Success on Their First Amendment Claim
A. Standard of Review
B. Substantive First Amendment Law
Nothing in the Constitution requires a state to
provide for the popular election of its judges.
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S.
765, 788, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 153 L. Ed. 2d 694
(2002). .... "[I]f the State chooses to tap the
energy and legitimizing power of the
democratic process, it must accord the
participants in that process the First
Amendment rights that attach to their roles."
Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 788
(internal quotation marks omitted and
alteration incorporated).
. . . Yet not every regulation that limits the
field of candidates is constitutionally suspect,
let alone unconstitutional....
Instead, we must first ascertain "the character
and magnitude of the asserted injury to the
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to
vindicate." Id. We must make that assessment
not "in isolation, but within the context of the
state's overall scheme of election
regulations." Lerman v. Bd. of Elections in the
City of New York, 232 F.3d 135, 145 (2d Cir.
2000). The Supreme Court has underscored
that in assessing the extent to which a given
set of candidate restrictions burdens First
Amendment rights, our review is neither
formalistic nor abstract. Instead, we must turn
a keen eye on how the electoral scheme
functions in fact; indeed, "it is essential to
examine in a realistic light the extent and
nature of [the scheme's] impact on voters."
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143, 92 S.
Ct. 849, 31 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1972).
If our realistic assessment yields the
conclusion that the electoral scheme lightly or
even moderately burdens First Amendment
rights, we apply a relaxed standard of review,
according to which the restrictions generally
are valid so long as they further an important
state interest. Lerman, 232 F.3d at 145. On
the other hand, if we conclude that a law
imposes severe burdens, we apply strict
scrutiny, which requires that the law be
necessary to serve a compelling state interest.
Id.; see also Bullock, 405 U.S. at 147 ("But
under the standard of review we consider
applicable to this case, there must be a
showing of necessity."). With those legal
principles as general background, we turn to
defendants' claims of error.
C. The District Court Did Not Find and Apply
an Overly Broad First Amendment Right of
Association
Defendants' most basic assertion is a unique
argument that does not fit easily within the
traditional framework set forth above. Instead
of focusing on the burdens that this electoral
scheme imposes, defendants focus on the
affirmative scope of the First Amendment
right upon which the District Court based its
decision. The District Court erred, defendants
maintain, because at bottom its decision rests
on an overly broad right of associational
freedom, namely, the "right to ... win a
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major party's nomination."
. In this case, the delegate primary election
and subsequent nominating convention are
State-created and legally required aspects of
the process of public choice in New York.
Further, as a practical matter, the evidence
established that the result of that nominating
process profoundly affects the choice at the
general election, a fact to which "we cannot
close our eyes" because it means that
exclusionary nominating-phase regulations
may well "operate to deprive the voter of his
constitutional right of choice." Classic, 313
U.S. at 319; see also Tery, 345 U.S. at 469;
Bullock, 405 U.S. at 146. Accordingly, both
segments of the nominating procedure are
integral parts of the State's election
machinery, and therefore subject to the
requirements and prohibitions of the First
Amendment.
2. The First Amendment Guarantees Voters
and Candidates a Realistic Opportunity to
Participate in the Nominating Phase Free
From Severe and Unnecessary Burdens
Having concluded that New York must afford
voters and candidates the right to associate
through and in the judicial nominating
process, we now examine the scope of that
right....
As we explain below, the First Amendment
affords candidates and voters a realistic
opportunity to participate in the nominating
process, and to do so free from burdens that
are both severe and unnecessary to further a
compelling state interest. Further, while
categorical race and sex-based exclusions
undoubtedly violate the associational rights of
voters and candidates, exclusions that result
from a complex of otherwise facially valid
regulations also may offend the First
Amendment.
Although no case has passed on a scheme
identical to New York's unique judicial
election process, the above principles derive
directly from a line of Supreme Court cases
limiting a State's power to structure its
elections and regulate access to its ballot....
These cases establish that the First
Amendment prohibits a state from
maintaining an electoral scheme that in
practice excludes candidates, and thus voters,
from participating in the electoral process,
unless the exclusionary regulations are
necessary to further a compelling state
interest....
3. The District Court Recognized and Applied
the Appropriate First Amendment Right
The District Court found that plaintiffs have
the "right to . . . compete for their major
party's nomination" free from burdens that
are both severe and unnecessary. Lopez
Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 411 F.
Supp. 2d 212, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (emphasis
added). Nowhere in its decision did the
District Court hold that plaintiffs possessed a
so-called right to win. We find no error in the
District Court's statement of a right to
"compete," although we believe our
discussion above sets forth a more precise
definition.
... New York's nominating process, as found
by the District Court, does not merely deprive
a candidate of a realistic chance to prevail;
rather, through the use of overlapping and
severe burdens, it deprives a candidate of
access altogether. The exclusion of
candidates, in turn, severely and unnecessarily
"limit[s] the field of candidates from which
voters might choose," which is our ultimate
and "primary concern" in assessing these
restrictions.. ..
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D. A Delegate-Based Nominating Convention
System Is Not Per Se Constitutional
Defendants next contend that pursuant to
Amer. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767,
94 S. Ct. 1296, 39 L. Ed. 2d 744 (1974), a
nominating convention is per se
constitutional. While we agree that a
convention-based system is, in the abstract, a
perfectly acceptable method of nomination,
we reject defendants' claim that all such
systems, regardless of how they are
implemented, are constitutional.
The first flaw in defendants' argument is that
it is counterfactual. New York's nominating
process does not consist only of a convention.
It also includes an open, albeit indirect,
primary election-an electoral phase that
defendants completely ignore. Yet the
primary election-at which party-backed
delegates are overwhelmingly "deemed
elected"-is of central importance to the
entire electoral process because it effectively
dictates the result of the convention, which in
turn greatly affects the result of the general
election...
Parties Do Not Justify New York's
Nominating Scheme
... As these cases and others make clear, the
First Amendment protects a political party's
right to determine the structure and content of
its own association....
For two reasons, however, we conclude that
these associational rights do not outweigh the
associational rights of qualified, party-
member voters and candidates. First, the
convention system considered in Ripon was,
by and large, a private function that directly
implicated the party's right to govern its own
internal affairs.
. . By contrast, New York's delegate
selection process is one of public election, see
N.Y. Elec. L. §§ 6-106, -124, which directly
implicates the associational rights of party-
members voters and candidates. . . . Indeed,
judicial delegates hold no party leadership
position and exercise no party authority other
than to act, in the ideal, as conscientious
proxies for the communities that elected
them.... We further note that the nomination
stage of judicial elections "effectively
controls the choice" at the general election-a
choice that the state constitution commits to
the public-and thus implicates voters' and
candidates' rights on this basis as well. United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299. 318, 61 S. Ct.
1031. 85 L. Ed. 1368 (1941); cf Ripon, 525
F.2d at 589 (noting that court's conclusion
"might be otherwise . . . where a vote in the
nominating process is the only effective vote
that can be cast").
Second, the regulations at issue here affect the
First Amendment rights of party members
much more severely than did those in Ripon
and Bachur. In Ripon, the regulations merely
diluted the votes of some party members
residing in those states that did not reap the
awards of the victory bonus system. Here, the
evidence showed that the political parties'
delegate allocation formulae do much more
than merely dilute the proportional efficacy of
votes vis a vis assembly districts within a
judicial district. Rather, the evidence showed
that a network of restrictive regulations
effectively excludes qualified candidates and
voters from participating in the primary
election and subsequent convention, and thus
severely limits voter choice at the general
election....
In reaching this conclusion, we note that in all
events, political parties remain free to
publicly endorse and support a candidate of
their own choosing. See Eu, 489 U.S. at 223.
What New York state and its political parties
may not do is exclude from the nominating
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process qualified party-member candidates
and voters who wish to support them. Such a
limitation on the parties' associational activity
is modest. to be sure, and neither encroaches
on matters of internal governance, curtails the
party's ability to communicate with the
public, nor risks "saddl[ing a party] with an
unwanted, and possibly antithetical,
nominee." Jones, 530 U.S. at 579.
F. The Existence of an Alternate Means of
Access to the General Election Ballot Does
Not Automatically Render Constitutional
New York's Regulation of the Primary
Election Ballot and Nominating Convention
Defendants claim that because a candidate
may access the general election ballot as an
independent candidate, see N.Y. Elec. Law §§
6-138, -142(2), or write-in candidate, see
N.Y. Elec. Law §§ 7-104(7), -106(8), the
provisions regulating access to the primary
ballot and nominating convention are "a
fortiori" constitutional. (Blue 41-45)
However, the Supreme Court already has
rejected that argument....
G. The Burdens Imposed by N.Y. Elec. L. §§
6-106, -124 Are Severe
... [T]he District Court correctly adopted the
perspective of a candidate who has at least
some measure of popular support but lacks
the support of party leadership, and has no
other means of overcoming the burdens
imposed by the electoral scheme.
2. New York's Judicial Election Process
Severely Burdens the Associational Rights of
Voters and Candidates
Defendants claim that the District Court erred
in finding that the structure of the primary
election. its petitioning requirements, and the
delegate lobbying process severely burden
First Amendment associational rights. We
disagree.
Defendants first claim that the District Court
relied too heavily on Rockefeller v. Powers,
917 F. Supp. 155 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 78
F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1996), in concluding that the
petition signature requirements for running a
slate of delegates severely burden a judicial
candidate's ability to access the primary
election stage of the electoral process. In
particular, defendants contend that since we
subsequently limited Rockefeller to "the
special circumstances of that case," it was
error for the District Court to rely upon it. See
Prestia v. O'Connor, 178 F.3d 86, 87 (2d Cir.
1999) (per curiam).
However, the District Court did not err by
drawing an analogy to Rockefeller; even
though that case is limited, it remains
applicable in similar factual circumstances.
See, e.g., Lerman, 232 F.3d at 152 (relying on
Rockefeller). More importantly, other
applicable case law and the record evidence
wholly support the District Court's
conclusion. In Lerman, 232 F.3d 135, we held
unconstitutional a statute that required a
petition signature witness to live within the
district that the candidate was seeking to
represent. We took account of a resource
disparity between well-equipped candidates
"who are . . . favored by their party's
leadership" and other candidates lacking
resources, "especially those challenging their
party's leadership." Id. at 147. We also noted
that "as a practical matter a candidate seeking
election needs a surplus of signatures because
they likely will be challenged on a number of
grounds." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Finally. we recognized that the
prohibition on a voter signing more than one
petition caused a candidate to "face a
shrinking pool of potential signatories" as
other candidates sought out signatures. Id. at
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148 (internal quotation marks omitted). Based
on those considerations, we invalidated the
witness residency requirements, even though
the candidate at issue in Lernian needed to
gather only 38 signatures. Id. at 139.
. . . The District Court properly found these
burdens severe.
. . . All of the evidence presented, and
accepted by the District Court, reduces to this
bottom line: through a byzantine and onerous
network of nominating phase regulations
employed in areas of one-party rule, New
York has transformed a dejure election into a
de facto appointment. "[I]n every practical
sense," these regulations preclude all but
candidates favored by party leadership "from
seeking the nomination of their chosen party,
no matter how qualified they might be, and no
matter how broad or enthusiastic their popular
support." Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143-44. "The
effect of this exclusionary mechanism on
voters" is to "substantially limit[] . . . their
choice of candidates." Id. at 144. Under these
circumstances, the District Court properly
concluded that New York's judicial
nominating process severely burdens the
associational rights of candidates and voters
alike.
H. The District Court Properly Concluded that
New York's Electoral Scheme Is Not
Narrowly Tailored to Further A Compelling
State Interest
Defendants advance six compelling state
interests: (1) protecting a political party's
associational right to choose its own nominee;
(2) preventing party raiding; (3) protecting the
associational rights of political parties to
create geographically and racially balanced
slates of nominees; (4) promoting racial and
ethnic diversity on the state bench; (5)
promoting geographic diversity on the state
bench; and (6) promoting judicial
independence by "protecting incumbents and
otherwise ameliorating the ill effects of
political campaigning on the judiciary."
With respect to protecting a political party's
right to associate with a candidate of its own
choosing, we already have rejected the notion
that, under New York's constitutional and
statutory scheme, a party has the right to
exclude its own members from the
nominating phase. . . . Accordingly, we
decline to recognize a compelling state
interest in allowing political parties to exclude
their own members from the nominating
component of the state-run elective process at
issue here.
Nonetheless, under New York's scheme,
parties do retain the right to select a preferred
candidate and advocate on her behalf, and we
agree that protecting those rights is a
compelling state interest. See, e.g., Eu, 489
U.S. 214, 109 S. Ct. 1013, 103 L. Ed. 2d 271.
In this case, the current scheme is not
narrowly tailored to achieve that end because
there exist several less onerous means by
which a state may secure the party's right to
guide its own association in this fashion. First
of all, New York State could allow parties to
associate with their favored candidates by
permitting parties to finance those candidates,
directly and indirectly, at the nominating
stage-a practice that is illegal under the
current statutory scheme. . . Moreover, as we
have noted, a party may recruit its own
candidates and publicly endorse them, and it
may speak out against candidates it disfavors.
In short, New York's political parties possess
such large financial and institutional
advantages over any given challenger that
they hardly need to exclude qualified
candidates and voters in order to shape the
course of their association.
The next state interest that defendants
proffer-guarding against party raiding-is
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compelling in its own right. . . . Defendants
urge that the current scheme "thwarts party
raiding by funneling the nominating process
through smaller groups of delegates who are
intimately familiar with the qualifications of
judicial candidates seeking the party's
nomination.
Even assuming that party raiding actually is a
problem in New York State's judicial
elections-and the record does not establish
that it is-and assuming further that the
current scheme thwarts it, there are less
onerous ways to prevent the practice.
Defendants have failed to show that the
electoral system, in its current form, is
necessary to prevent the party raiding they
fear. . . .
Defendants claim two types of interests in
promoting geographic and racial diversity: a
party's associational interest in creating
racially and geographically balanced slates of
nominees and the state's interest in creating a
racially and geographically balanced bench.
As an initial matter, we note some skepticism
as to whether the current scheme effectively
serves those interests. A survey of the
composition of the state's bench at the time
this suit was filed suggests that over the
course of 85 years the nominating process
has, to put it mildly, failed to fully effectuate
the state s goals as to geographic and racial
diversity ...
At the time plaintiffs filed this litigation, five
judicial districts-almost half the state's
total-had no minority Justices, even though
minorities make up between 7.4 percent and
27 percent of the voting age population in
those judicial districts. Judicial districts that
do have at least one minority Justice
nonetheless reflect wide disparities in the
number of minority Justices compared to the
percentage of voting age population that
minorities comprise. ...
Similar disparities exist as to geography. In
the Seventh Judicial District, Monroe County
is home to only 59 percent of the voters but
boasts 19 out of 22 Justices....
These striking statistics are not dispositive of
the issue. We cannot be certain precisely how
well or poorly the current scheme promotes
the State's ends because, given that this
system has existed since 1921, we have no
sound basis for comparison; it is perhaps
possible that, absent the current scheme, the
situation, poor as it is now, would be worse.
However, the burden of demonstrating that
the current scheme reasonably serves the
asserted interests falls on defendants, . . . and
it is not clear that defendants have met that
burden.
Setting these empirical doubts to one side, we
rest our conclusion on the ground relied upon
by the District Court: less burdensome means
exist to promote racial and geographic
diversity with respect to slates of nominees
and sitting judges. New York could redraw
judicial districts to provide for majority-
minority districts, for county-specific
districts, or for districts that more closely
reflect some combination of geographic and
racial constituencies. N.Y. Const. art. VI, §
6(b). New York also could require that
Justices live in the districts in which they sit,
so that the Justices of a judicial district truly
represent its racial, ethnic, and geographic
constituency.
Finally, with respect to promoting judicial
independence, the Supreme Court has
recognized only a limited sort of compelling
state interest: preventing actual or apparent
"bias for or against either party to the
proceeding," i.e., actual litigants before the
court. Republican Party of Minn. v. White,
536 U.S. 765, 775. 122 S. Ct. 2528, 153 L.
Ed. 2d 694 (2002). In the first place, we do
not see how the current system serves the goal
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of preventing this sort of bias better than any
other system. Further, less burdensome means
exist to serve that end. To the extent that
fundraising may implicate bias, New York
could provide for public campaign financing.
New York also could require that judges be
disqualified from cases in which one party has
contributed substantially to the judge's
campaign. Further, New York could pass a
narrowly tailored law preventing a judicial
candidate from campaigning based on her
views "for or against particular parties." Id. at
776.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above,
the District Court properly concluded that
New York's judicial nominating process is
not necessary to further a compelling state
interest, and therefore that plaintiffs
demonstrated a clear likelihood of success on
their First Amendment claim....
III. The District Court Did Not Exceed Its
Allowable Discretion in Ordering that Judicial
Nominations Proceed Via Primary Election
Until the Legislature Enacts Corrective
Legislation
A. General Remedial Principles
"Once a right and a violation have been
shown, the scope of a district court's
equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is
broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent
in equitable remedies." Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15. 91
S. Ct. 1267, 28 L. Ed. 2d 554 (1971). Indeed,
"[iun shaping equity decrees, the trial court is
vested with broad discretionary power;
appellate review is correspondingly narrow.
Moreover, in constitutional adjudication as
elsewhere. equitable remedies are a special
blend of what is necessary, what is fair, and
what is workable." Lenon v. Kurtznan, 411
U.S. 192, 200. 93 S. Ct. 1463. 36 L. Ed. 2d
151 (1973).
The Supreme Court recently set forth "[t]here
interrelated principles [that] inform our
approach to remedies." Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S.
320, 126 S. Ct. 961, 967, 163 L. Ed. 2d 812
(2006). First, a district court must not "nullify
more of a legislature's work than is
necessary" to remedy the violation. Id.
Second, the court must "restrain [itself] from
rewriting state law to conform it to
constitutional requirements." Id. at 968
(internal quotation marks omitted and
alterations incorporated). A court must
scrupulously observe that limitation when
operating "in a murky constitutional context,
or where line-drawing is inherently complex,"
because failure to do so would entail a
"serious invasion of the legislative domain."
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Third,
"the touchstone for any decision about
remedy is legislative intent." Id. We now
apply these principles to the facts at hand.
B. The District Court Acted Within Its
Discretion in Crafting a Remedy
Four aspects of the District Court's interim
remedy are relevant to our review. First,
having found New York's judicial nominating
process violative of the First Amendment, the
District Court fully enjoined the two statutory
provisions that provide for that scheme. See
N.Y. Elec. L. (§ 6-106, -124. Second, the
District Court recognized that the choice of a
permanent remedy rests exclusively with the
State Legislature. Third, the Court declined to
leave the State entirely without a judicial
nominating process until the Legislature takes
corrective action. Accordingly, relying on
New York's default election provision-
which provides that "[a]ll other party
nominations of candidates for offices to be
filled at a general election, except as provided
for herein. shall be made at the primary
election," N.Y. Elec. L. § 6-1 10-the Court
ordered that judicial nominations shall
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proceed by primary election until the
Legislature enacts corrective legislation.
Fourth, the Court stayed all aspects of its
remedy until after the 2006 election cycle.
Judging by the most conservative time frame,
this stay afforded the Legislature almost nine
months in which to act before the 2007
election cycle would begin, and roughly 18
months' time in which to act before any
judicially-ordered primary might occur....
. . . We disagree with defendants for four
reasons. First, we see little ultimate difference
between what defendants claim the District
Court should have done and what it actually
did. If the District Court had merely enjoined
the current nominating scheme, the default
nature of section 6-110 would have resulted in
a primary election by operation of law. By
recognizing this, the District Court merely
clarified the state of affairs that would exist.
although less obviously, in any event.
Second, it would have been impractical, if not
irresponsible, for the District Court to have
left such a gaping hole in the State's electoral
scheme. Lemon, 411 U.S. at 200 ("[E]quitable
remedies are a special blend of what is
necessary, what is fair, and what is
workable."). Third, the Legislature is free to
enact a new nominating scheme well before
any court-ordered primary might occur. The
Court recognized that the choice of a final
solution falls to the Legislature and stayed its
interim remedy for nearly a year, which
allows that body plenty of time to head off
any possible primary election if it so desires.
Indeed, just weeks after the District Court
issued its decision, the State Senate passed a
bill providing for primary elections for the
office of Supreme Court Justice. See S. 55-A,
2005-06 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2006). This
development illustrates that the Legislature
can indeed craft its own solution prior to the
commencement of a primary election.
Fourth, the default nature of section 6-110
shows that, as a general matter, the State
Legislature is not nearly as opposed to
primary elections as defendants contend. In
fact, nominations for other judicial offices,
such as Civil Court Judge and County Court
Judge, are made by primary election....
We come now to the final piece of business
before us. At oral argument and in a
subsequent submission to the Court, counsel
for the State Attorney General and the State
Legislature as amicus curiae requested that
we further stay the District Court's injunction
until after the 2007 election cycle, so that the
District Court's remedy would not take effect
until December 31, 2007. Until that time, the
current nominating scheme would operate
unabated.
Apart from the fact that the Attorney General
and Legislature should have directed their
request to the District Court in the first
instance, see Fed. R. App. P. 8(a), it lacks
merit. "In this Circuit, four factors are
considered before staying the actions of a
lower court: (1) whether the movant will
suffer irreparable injury absent a stay, (2)
whether a party will suffer irreparable injury
if a stay is issued, (3) whether the movant has
demonstrated a substantial possibility.
although less than a likelihood of success, on
appeal, and (4) the public interests that may
be affected." Hirschfeld v. Bd. of Elections,
984 F.2d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1993)....
None of these factors favor defendants.
Defendants have failed to show an irreparable
injury that they would suffer absent a stay. On
the other hand, if the current electoral scheme
persists for yet another election cycle, voters
and candidates will continue to suffer
irreparable constitutional injury. In this
opinion we have rejected defendants' claims
on appeal. Last, given the constitutional
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infirmity of New York's judicial nominating
process, its continuation cuts sharply against
the public interest...
Further, as practical matter, there is more than
one year's time between the issuance of this
opinion and any possible primary election,
which gives the Legislature sufficient time to
consider and enact a new nominating scheme.
Indeed, one house of the Legislature already
has passed a new scheme, and did so only
weeks after the District Court issued its
opinion. In its submission to this Court, the
Legislature has pledged to "move as
expeditiously as necessary to devise a
workable solution." We take it at its word.
CONCLUSION
We hold that the District Court acted within
its allowable discretion in finding a clear
likelihood of success on plaintiffs' First
Amendment claim because (1) the First
Amendment affords voters and candidates the
right to participate in New York's judicial
nominating process free from burdens that are
severe and unnecessary to further a
compelling state interest; (2) the District
Court applied the proper First Amendment
standard; (3) a convention-based nominating
system is not per se constitutional; (4) the
parties' associational rights, by themselves,
do not justify the current scheme; (5) a
reasonable means of general election ballot
access for independent or write-in candidates
does not render the nominating process
constitutional; (6) the nominating system
imposes severe burdens on the associational
rights of voters and candidates; and (7) the
regulations are not narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling state interest. We further hold
that the District Court was not required to
give notice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a).
Finally, we hold that the District Court acted
within its allowable discretion by (1)
enjoining defendants from enforcing N.Y.
Elec. L. §§ 6-106, -124, and (2) requiring that
nominations be settled by primary election
until the State Legislature enacts corrective
legislation. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the
District Court's order dated January 27, 2006.
AFFIRMED.
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"Judge Selection to Be Reviewed
by U.S. Justices"
The New York Times
February 1. 2007
Linda Greenhouse
WASHINGTON-The United States
Supreme Court agreed on Tuesday to review
New York's method of selecting candidates
to its own Supreme Courts-the 324 judges
who have general trial jurisdiction
throughout the state and whose nomination
to 14-year terms is tightly controlled by a
political process that two lower federal
courts declared unconstitutional last year.
The lower court rulings, which were stayed
until after the 2006 election cycle, have
created turmoil in the state's judicial politics
and spurred calls for fundamental change in
a system that dates to 1921. The political
parties control the nominating conventions,
and candidates who are not favored by the
parties' leaders have no chance of getting on
the ballot. The actual elections are for the
most part uncontested.
From 1994 to 2002, these nominating
conventions in the state's 12 judicial
departments chose 568 State Supreme Court
candidates, none of whom were challengers
to the party favorites. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a
ruling last August affirming a decision
issued five months earlier by Judge John
Gleeson of Federal District Court in
Brooklyn, ruled that the system was so
exclusionary as to violate the First
Amendment right of the state's voters to
freedom of political association.
"The First Amendment guarantees voters
and candidates a realistic opportunity to
participate in the nominating phase free
from severe and unnecessary burdens."
Judge Chester J. Straub wrote for a three-
judge panel of the appeals court. He added
that the United States Supreme Court's
election-law precedents "establish that the
First Amendment prohibits a state from
maintaining an electoral scheme that in
practice excludes candidates, and thus
voters, from participating in the electoral
process."
The ruling was appealed to the Supreme
Court by the New York State Board of
Elections, joined by several political
organizations; the incumbent State Supreme
Court justices; and by Attorney General
Eliot Spitzer, who was governor-elect by the
time the appeal reached the court on
Nov. 28.
Governor Spitzer's view of the case will be
a matter of some interest as it goes forward.
Addressing the Rockefeller Institute of
Government shortly after his election as
governor, Mr. Spitzer indicated that he did
not support the existing system, which he
said was "in dire need of reform."
According to an account in The New York
Law Journal, the governor-elect said that
"there must be a way to primary onto the
ballot," and added that "I will not support
anything that has a closed convention
structure, where only those who came out of
the convention could be on the ballot."
Governor Spitzer's office in Albany said on
Tuesday that he would have no comment on
the Supreme Court decision to hear the case,
New York Board of Elections v. Torres, No.
06-766. The court will take up the case
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when its next term begins in October. It
could be a year from now, or longer, before
the justices issue a decision.
That long waiting period presents
considerable uncertainty. Under Judge
Gleeson's original ruling, the state will have
to begin to use a primary election system
unless it comes up with another way to
satisfy the court's constitutional concerns. A
bill to establish primary elections as the way
to choose State Supreme Court nominees
passed the State Senate last year and was
reintroduced at the beginning of the new
session in January.
But primaries present their own problems,
including the need for candidates to raise
considerable amounts of money. (Money is
also an issue with the nominating
conventions; a judge who was arrested in
Brooklyn on corruption charges several
years ago asserted that the going rate in the
borough for the Democratic nomination for
judge was $50,000.)
A task force convened by the New York
City Bar Association in response to the court
rulings recommended a system of merit
selection, under which bar associations,
civic groups and others would screen and
present a list of candidates from which the
governor or, in New York City, the mayor
would choose.
Mark H. Alcott, president of the New York
State Bar Association, said on Tuesday that
the organization had long supported a merit
selection system. The shift to such a system
would require a state constitutional
amendment. The Constitution was amended
in 1846 to require election of State Supreme
Court justices.
The challenge to the convention system was
brought by a group of judicial candidates,
Republican and Democratic voters, and the
civic group Common Cause, represented by
the Brennan Center for Justice at New York
University Law School. The lead plaintiff,
Margarita Lopez Torres, who is now the
Brooklyn surrogate court judge, tried and
failed several times to obtain a Democratic
nomination for State Supreme Court. As an
elected Civil Court judge, she refused an
order to make a patronage appointment of a
law secretary, and complained that she was
told by a party leader that she "did not
understand the way it works."
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"2nd Circuit Rejects N.Y. Judicial Conventions: Court Says
System Violates Rights of Voters and Candidates Alike"
New York Law Journal
September 1, 2006
Daniel Wise
NEW YORK-This year should be the last
that political parties in New York can use
the state's arcane convention system to
nominate candidates for Supreme Court, the
2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
Wednesday.
The unanimous ruling in Lipez Torres v.
New York State Board of Elections, 06-
0635, written by Judge Chester J. Straub,
upheld on all counts Eastern District Judge
John Gleeson's January ruling that the
system violates the First Amendment rights
of voters and candidates alike.
The circuit also rejected requests from both
the state Attorney General's Office and the
state Legislature for an additional year to
devise a new nomination system.
The ruling agreed with Judge Gleeson's
constitutional and factual analysis that the
convention system, as presently structured,
is a top-down apparatus totally controlled by
party leaders, which tramples the
associational rights of candidates lacking
leadership support to run for Supreme Court.
"All of the evidence presented, and accepted
by the District Court, reduces to this bottom
line," Judge Straub wrote. "Through a
byzantine and onerous network of
nominating phase regulations employed in
areas of one-party rule, New York has
transformed a de jure election into a de facto
appointment."
Judges Sonia Sotomayor and Peter W. Hall
joined the opinion.
Gleeson had ordered that the state use
primary elections to select Supreme Court
candidates until the Legislature fashioned its
own remedy. He had stayed his ruling
through this year's elections.
Both the attorney general and the
Legislature asked for an additional year in
the event the circuit agreed with Gleeson
that the existing system is unconstitutional.
But Straub concluded that, "given the
constitutional infirmity of New York's
judicial nominating process, [the convention
system's] continuation cuts sharply against
the public interest." Moreover, he noted, the
stay approved by Gleeson, which leaves at
least a year until any primary election would
be required, "gives the Legislature sufficient
time to consider and enact a new nominating
scheme."
Reacting to the ruling. Frederick A. 0.
Schwarz of Cravath, Swaine & Moore, who
argued the plaintiffs' case before the 2nd
Circuit for the Brennan Center for Justice.
said, "This was a very important
constitutional case. Now we can and should
find a way to make significant
improvements in the way New York state
picks its Supreme Court judges. The ball is
in the Legislature's court."
But Andrew J. Rossman of Akin Gump
Strauss Hauer & Feld, who represented the
New York County Democratic Committee,
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suggested the fight was far from over.
"We're obviously disappointed." he said.
"We think it was wrongly decided and we're
considering further appellate options."
Rossman said those options are to seek en
banc review by the full panel of the 2nd
Circuit or to seek a writ of certiorari from
the U.S. Supreme Court.
"This [Second Circuit panel] has given
greater deference to a district court judge
than to the Legislature," said Rossman. "It is
the appropriate role of the Legislature to
decide how its citizens are going to vote,
especially votes within a political party."
New York is the only state in the nation that
uses a convention system to nominate
candidates for its 328 Supreme Court
judgeships.
Doubts About Primaries
Many of the groups that submitted amicus
briefs supporting Judge Gleeson's ruling
expressed strong doubts about replacing the
convention system with primaries.
Grave concerns were expressed that
primaries would force candidates to raise
large sums of money from lawyers and
potential parties with interests in cases that
candidates might be called on to decide if
elected. Similarly. concerns were raised that
candidates would be forced to engage in the
rough and tumble of campaigning where
they would face pressure to comment on
issues likely to come before them in
violation of judicial ethics rules.
Spokesmen for both Senate Majority Leader
Joseph L. Bruno, R-Rensselaer County, and
Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver,
D-Manhattan, said they had not seen the
ruling as of Wednesday afternoon and were
unprepared to speculate on how, or if, the
Legislature would address the 2nd Circuit's
decision.
New York State Bar Association President
Mark Alcott on Wednesday urged the
Legislature to switch to an appointive
system, in which justices would be chosen
by the governor, or other elected officials,
after having their qualifications screened by
a non-political panel.
"The conventions are now out, and I don't
think anybody desires an open primary
system," said Alcott, a partner at Paul,
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison. "The
judges don't want it, and I don't think the
politicians want it either. What's in it for
them? So, let's implement real reform, and
merit selection is real reform."
Victor A. Kovner, a former New York City
corporation counsel and chairman of the
Fund for Modern Courts, said the ruling is
"a clarion call" for the Legislature to enact
corrective legislation this year.
"There is broad support for a revised
convention system with meaningful access
to all candidates," Kovner said, "and for
providing the delegates with the benefit a
non-binding impartial evaluation of
aspirants by independent, broadly based and
diverse qualifications commissions."
The fund's proposal closely hews to the
recommendations of a commission
appointed by Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye,
which was headed by former Fordham Law
School Dean John D. Feerick. The Feerick
Commission in February recommended that
the convention process be simplified by
reducing both the number of delegates at
conventions and the number of signatures
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needed to place them on the ballot. The
commission also recommended a number of
changes to insure that delegates have an
independent opportunity to review
candidates' qualifications.
Brooklyn District Attorney Charles J.
Hynes, who has spearheaded a three-year
probe of the way Supreme Court justices are
chosen, however, called for the abolition of
the convention system. "I would hope that
the New York state Legislature will move
swiftly to end forever the convention
system," he said, "which has for too long
disenfranchised the voters in this state of
their right to freely elect judges of the state
Supreme Court, the most important trial
court in this state."
Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman John
A. DeFrancisco, R-Syracuse, called for an
approach that could involve a primary
election. Last year, before Ldpez Torres was
decided by Gleeson, the Senate passed a bill
which would permit Supreme Court
candidates who did not garner the support of
political leaders to mount a petition drive
and force a primary election.
"I think it's time to pass my bill,"
DeFrancisco said. "[It] makes the most
sense in that it would allow for those who
are not selected by the party leadership to do
a primary, just like all the other judges."
Factual Findings
In upholding Judge Gleeson, the 2nd Circuit
pointed to a number of his factual findings
as pivotal to his conclusion that only those
rich in either political support or wealth
could negotiate the existing convention
system:
* Convention candidates are required to
collect at least 9,000 petition signatures and
as many as 24,000 within 37 days to field a
full slate of delegates, depending on which
of the state's 12 judicial districts they are
running in.
* Depending upon the district they are
running in, judicial candidates must field
slates of least 32 delegate candidates and as
many as 124 delegates. In addition, they are
required to field slates consisting of an equal
amount of alternative delegates.
* Over a four-year period in four of the
state's 12 judicial districts, including
Manhattan, where the most primary contests
occur. 90 percent of the convention
delegates were chosen without a primary
because they had no opposition.
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"Citizens' Group and Others Sue New York State
Over System for Selecting Top Trial Judges"
The New York Times
March
William
19, 2004
Glaberson
NEW YORK-Challenging the influence of
political party leaders over the selection of top
trial judges statewide, a citizens' group filed a
lawsuit yesterday saying the current system is a
sham that violates the United States Constitution
by depriving voters of any meaningful choice.
The suit, by Common Cause and nine would-be
candidates and voters, was clearly inspired by
the judicial scandal centered in Brooklyn, which
has included allegations of cronyism, bribery
and corruption. The lead plaintiff was an elected
Civil Court judge in Brooklyn, Margarita Lopez
Torres, who has been publicly at odds with
Brooklyn Democratic leaders who repeatedly
denied her a nomination for the Supreme Court,
the state's highest-level trial court.
But the suit, filed in Federal District Court in
Brooklyn, cast a net far wider than judicial
selection in Brooklyn and included attacks on
the system run by both Democratic and
Republican leaders across the state. It said
voters are denied any meaningful vote in "this
undemocratic system" under which candidates
for State Supreme Court are chosen by
conventions whose delegates are generally
named by party leaders.
"The right to vote is the prime necessity of
having a democracy," said Frederick A.O.
Schwarz Jr., senior counsel of the Brennan
Center for Justice, a public-interest law center
that filed the suit on behalf of the plaintiffs. Mr.
Schwarz was the city's corporation counsel
under Mayor Edward I. Koch.
The suit focused only on State Supreme Court
judgeships, claiming that the convention system
undermines fundamental democratic principles.
Candidates for many lower-level trial courts are
selected in primary elections. But in the eight
years ending in 2002, the suit said, 568
candidates were nominated around the state for
Supreme Court seats and not a single challenger
to party leaders' handpicked candidates
managed to win a nomination.
Experts on constitutional and election law said
the case raised significant issues, though they
said it faced hurdles because federal courts are
often reluctant to step into state election
controversies.
"This lawsuit raises questions of whether there
is an obligation to have real competition in
election systems," said Samuel Issacharoff, a
Columbia Law School professor. "And that is at
the heart of many of the most important cases
on election law in the courts today."
The suit asked Judge John Gleeson of Federal
District Court to declare that the current system
"imposes a severe burden on the candidates' and
voters' fundamental right to vote" and requested
that the court bar the conventions. It said Judge
Gleeson should permit the Legislature to
establish a new selection system, but should in
the meantime order that primaries be held.
Pamela S. Karlan, an election law expert at
Stanford Law School, said the federal courts
have often shied away from declaring that
limitations on voters' choices violate the federal
Constitution, except in extreme cases, like those
involving racial discrimination.
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The court scandal, which has included the
indictment of one Brooklyn Supreme Court
justice and a guilty plea by another, has led to a
series of reform proposals by a state
commission and the Legislature.
The State Board of Elections was named as the
defendant. A spokesman declined to comment.
Some politicians have defended the convention
system, arguing in Brooklyn, for example, that
the system has helped political leaders work to
improve diversity.
Yesterday, Bob Liff, a spokesman for the
Brooklyn Democratic Party leader, Clarence
Norman Jr., said the convention system allows
for careful review of candidates' qualifications,
without the need for expensive primary races.
The Brooklyn district attorney, Charles J.
Hynes, has filed charges against Mr. Norman,
including assertions that he tried to strong-arm
judicial candidates into hiring certain
consultants.
The state Democratic chairman, Herman D.
Farrell Jr., said decisions about how to select
judges should not be up to a federal judge. "I do
not believe this action has a constitutional leg to
stand on," he said.
Judge Lopez Torres, the Civil Court judge who
was listed as the lead plaintiff, has become
something of a symbol in the battle over judicial
selection in Brooklyn. She won her seat as a
Democrat in 1992, but split with the party
several years ago. Her supporters have said she
was punished for refusing to hire people
recommended by party bosses.
After being denied a party nomination for
Supreme Court justice in November, she ran for
that court under the banner of the Working
Families Party. She was soundly defeated. Mr.
Liff, Mr. Norman's spokesman, said yesterday
that "failure to be successful in an election is
not, in and of itself, a violation of the
Constitution."
Judge Lopez Torres said yesterday, "I think
there s a real need to restore public confidence
in the courts."
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"Questioning Conventional Behavior"
ABA Journal
April 1, 2007
Mark Hansen
On Nov. 3, 1992, Margarita Lopez Torres
seemed well on the way to realizing her goal
of becoming a New York State Supreme
Court judge.
Lopez Torres, a 1979 graduate of Rutgers
University law school who had spent 13 years
as a New York City and legal services lawyer,
had just been elected a civil court judge in
Brooklyn. And the path to a seat on the
supreme court, the state's trial court of
general jurisdiction, typically includes a stint
in civil court.
Within a day of her election to the civil court
bench, however, Lopez Torres may have
ruined her chances of ever becoming a
supreme court judge, according to court
opinions.
It began when Lopez Torres resisted pressure
from powerful Democratic Party officials in
Brooklyn-who had supported her bid for a
seat on the civil court-to hire as her law
clerk a young lawyer and party operative
whom she regarded as unqualified.
Party officials chastised her afterward for not
hiring the lawyer they had referred to her,
according to the opinions, and scolded her for
not understanding how "the process" worked.
They also told her to fire the law clerk she
had hired and replace him with their man.
And when she refused, they told her she
would never receive the party's nomination
for a supreme court judgeship, which in
Brooklyn is tantamount to winning an
election.
Three years later, Lopez Torres was given a
chance to redeem herself, the opinions say. It
came when a local party leader told her he
would get her nominated for an upcoming
vacancy on the supreme court that had been
"earmarked for a 'Latino."' The catch was
that she would have to fire her law clerk and
hire the party boss's daughter, a recent law
school graduate, to replace him.
Lopez Torres once again refused to do the
party leader's bidding. From then on, party
officials not only blocked her attempts to
become a supreme court judge, the opinions
conclude, but actively worked against her in
2002, when she was re-elected to the civil
court, and again in 2006, when she was
elected a surrogate court judge.
By then Lopez Torres had had enough. In
fact, she had already become the lead plaintiff
in a 2004 federal suit challenging the
constitutionality of the state's unique-some
would say bizarre-way of picking trial court
judges of general jurisdiction.
The case wound its way through the federal
courts, and the U.S. Supreme Court has
agreed to hear the case in the fall.
New York is one of 39 states that elect at least
some of their judges. But it is the only state
that chooses candidates for trial court judges
of general jurisdiction through a system of
nominating conventions controlled by the two
major political parties.
The convention system, which has been in
place since 1921, not only distinguishes New
York from every other state but also
distinguishes the office of supreme court
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judge from every other elective judicial office
in New York. Other judge candidates are
chosen in primary elections.
Only supreme court judges are selected
through judicial nominating conventions.
Lopez Torres declined to comment on her
quest to become a state supreme court judge,
citing the pending litigation.
Power to the Party
More than a year ago, U.S. District Judge
John Gleeson of Brooklyn ruled that the
state's supreme court selection process was
unconstitutional because it gives local party
leaders, not the people, the power to decide
who becomes a judge-and when.
In a 77-page decision, Gleeson said
plaintiffs had demonstrated convincingly
the system deprives the voters of
meaningful role in the selection process.
the
that
any
"The result is an opaque, undemocratic
selection procedure that violates the rights of
the voters and the rights of the candidates
who lack the backing of the local party
leaders," he wrote. Lopez Torres v. New York
State Board of Elections, 411 F. Supp. 2d
212 (2006).
Gleeson's order recounts at length the details
of Lopez Torres' long and tortured efforts to
become a supreme court judge in Brooklyn,
an experience that he says serves as a
microcosm of the way the selection process
operates.
"The path to the office of supreme court
justice runs through the county leader of the
major party that dominates in that part of New
York state," he wrote.
"Without his or her support. neither superior
qualifications nor widespread support among
registered voters matters." That, the judge
said, was clearly the case with Lopez Torres.
In his decision, Gleeson ordered state
lawmakers to come up with a new way of
selecting supreme court judges. Until they do,
he said, those positions must be filled the way
most other judgeships in the state are through
primary elections.
Gleeson's ruling was affirmed last August by
the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals at New
York City, 462 F.3d 161.
The state legislature, meanwhile, is
considering its options, which to date have
included changing the convention system to
make it more open and democratic, adopting
an elective system, and enacting an appointive
process based on merit.
State bar officials view the moment as a
historic opportunity to do away with judicial
elections altogether and adopt a merit
selection process for filling judgeships, an
approach they have been advocating since the
early 1970s. Under merit selection,
prospective judges are screened by a
committee of lawyers and laypeople that
chooses a short list of presumably qualified
candidates from which the governor must fill
a vacancy.
"We want to take the political clubhouse out
of the courthouse and start selecting our
judges solely on merit, not on the basis of
their political credentials or who they know or
what serves the interests of party leaders,"
says New York State Bar Association
President Mark H. Alcott.
Mixed Feelings About Merit
But several minority bar associations have
expressed concern over the possible adoption
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of an appointive process, which they fear will
be less inclusive of women and minority
candidates than an elective judiciary has been.
And Lopez Torres, in testimony late last year
before the state assembly's standing
committee on the judiciary, said she wasn't
convinced that an appointive process
necessarily guarantees a more qualified, more
diverse or less politicized judiciary than an
elective one.
"The existence of an elective process,
however imperfect, at least provides a
possible route for those who are not favored
by a controlling political establishment," she
told the committee.
Even its proponents recognize that a merit
selection system, which would require a
constitutional amendment passed by two
successive sessions of the legislature and then
ratification by the voters, will take at least
three years to implement.
That may explain why support appeared to be
growing in early February for a possible
interim solution that essentially would keep
the old convention nominating system but
allow judicial hopefuls who fail to receive the
party's nomination another way to get on the
ballot.
Under the proposals being floated in the
legislature, those candidates could do so
either by polling a certain percentage of the
vote of delegates at the convention or by
collecting on a petition a certain number of
signatures from registered voters.
Frederick A. 0. Schwarz Jr. is senior counsel
at the Brennan Center for Justice at New York
University School of Law and lead counsel
for the plaintiffs in Lopez Torres. He says
there are two possible short-term solutions to
the chief constitutional problem presented by
the convention system, which is the exclusion
of the voters from any meaningful
participation in the nominating process.
One solution would be to hold primary
elections, which are used for every other
judicial office in the state and in most other
states with elective judiciaries.
Another is a convention system that allows
viable candidates who are not the party's
nominee a place on the ballot.
If the legislature does nothing, Schwarz says,
Gleeson has already decreed that supreme
court judges will be chosen through primary
elections. But if the legislature wants to do
something that is constitutionally defensible,
he says, it should consider the second option.
"This solution would give voters and candidates
a real voice and a genuine opportunity to
participate, while involving political parties in a
way that is familiar to all participants in our
state," Schwarz says.
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Washington v. Washington State Republican Party
(06-730)
Ruling Below: (Washington State Republican Party v. Washington, 460 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. Wash.
2006), cert granted, 127 S.Ct. 1373, 167 L.E.2d 158; 75 USLW 3456).
In November 2004, sixty percent of voters in the State of Washington passed Initiative 872, which
established a modified blanket primary election. The Washington State Republican Party, joined by
other state political parties, filed a 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 action in federal district court asserting that
the modified blanket primary violated their right of association under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. The court concluded that the modified blanket primary retained a partisan nature and
thus perpetuated a constitutionally crucial flaw identified in other blanket primary systems. A
candidate's expression of a party "preference" on the ballot in effect forced political parties to be
associated with self-identified candidates not of the parties' choosing. The court found that this
constituted a severe burden on the parties' associational rights and that the burden was not negated
by requiring voters to rely on the off-ballot statement of the candidates or parties to clarify the
nature of an actual party association. Appellants failed to articulate any compelling state interest
that justified such a burden. The court also concluded that Initiative 872 could not be saved by
severing its provisions for candidate party preferences. The court affirmed the permanent injunction
against the implementation of the Initiative.
Question Presented: Whether the modified blanket primary system allowing candidates to express
a party preference on a primary ballot irregardless of the party's opinion and choice
unconstitutionally burdens the First and Fourteenth Amendment associational rights of state
political parties.
WASHINGTON STATE REPUBLICAN PARTY,
Plaintiffs-Appellee
V.
State of WASHINGTON,
Defendants-Appellant
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Decided August 22. 2006
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]
FISHER. Circuit Judge: parties in Washington State are challenging
the constitutionality of their state's partisan
For the second time in three years, political primary system, which was enacted as a
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result of the passage of Initiative 872 in the
November 2004 state general election.
[W]e are mindful that Initiative 872 reflects
the political will of a majority of
Washington voters. Nonetheless, although
attempting to craft a primary system that
does not unconstitutionally burden political
parties' right of association under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, Initiative 872
fails to do so. Rather, the Initiative retains a
partisan primary, in which each candidate
may self-identify with a particular party
regardless of that party's willingness to be
associated with that candidate. The State of
Washington and Initiative 872's sponsor, the
Washington State Grange (the Grange), have
not identified any compelling state interests
that would justify the Initiative's severe
burden on the political parties' associational
rights; nor is Initiative 872's modified
blanket primary narrowly tailored. We
cannot sever the unconstitutional provisions
from Initiative 872 because "it cannot
reasonably be believed that" Washington
voters would have passed Initiative 872
without its unconstitutional provisions.
McGowan v. State, 148 Wn.2d 278, 60 P.3d
67, 75 (Wash. 2002). Accordingly, we hold
that Washington's modified blanket primary
as enacted by Initiative 872 is
unconstitutional and affirm the district
court's permanent injunction against the
implementation of the Initiative.
I. BACKGROUND
To understand the flaw in Initiative 872's
partisan primary system, it is helpful to
review the nature and structure of the
primary process in general. [The Court
explains that a "closed" primary is one in
which only voters who formally associate
themselves with a party in some fashion in
advance of the primary may vote in that
party's primary and thereby select the
party's nominee. See Cal. Democratic Party
v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 577 (2000). In
contrast, a "blanket" primary system uses a
common primary ballot shared by all
candidates. All voters, regardless of their
own political party affiliations, may vote for
any candidate appearing on the ballot
regardless of that candidate's designated
political party affiliation. The Supreme
Court, however, held that California's
blanket primary violated the state political
parties' right of association under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, because
allowing non-party members to vote for
party candidates forced a party's members to
associate with voters who were members of
rival parties. See id. at 577. The
Washington "blanket" system was similarly
struck down in 2003. Democratic Party of
Wash. v. Reed, 343 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th
Cir. 2003).]
In January 2004, the Grange filed the text of
what was to become Initiative 872 on the
November 2004 Washington ballot with the
Washington Secretary of State. Initiative
872 made a number of changes to
Washington's previous blanket primary
system; but significantly, it retained the
partisan nature of the primary. As the
official voters' pamphlet explaining
Initiative 872 stated, the Initiative "concerns
elections for partisan offices" and "would
change the system used for conducting
primaries and general elections for partisan
offices." (Emphasis added.)
Two of the most important proposed
changes were: (1) the redefinition of
''partisan office" as "a public office for
which a candidate may indicate a political
party preference"; and (2) the adoption of a
"top two" rule whereby the two candidates
with the greatest number of votes in the
primary advance to the general election
regardless of their expressed party
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preference. See Wash. Rev. Code §
29.30.020(3) (1993) (repealed 2004); see
also Reed, 343 F.3d at 1201 & n.3. Under
the Initiative 872 primary system, therefore,
those candidates expressing a particular
party "preference" would be self-identified
only; and the winner of the largest number
of votes among candidates with the same
party preference would no longer be
guaranteed a place on the general election
ballot-an entitlement limited to the two top
vote getters overall. See infra note 16.
Indeed, two candidates with the same party
preference could be the only candidates for a
particular office appearing on the general
election ballot.
* * *
[The Court explains the Washington State
Republican Party, the Washington State
Democratic Central Committee, and the
Libertarian Party of Washington State
brought suit in federal district court seeking
injunctive relief with respect to the
enforcement of Initiative 872.]
In July 2005, the district court granted the
political parties' motions for summary
judgment and issued a preliminary
injunction enjoining the enforcement of
Initiative 872. see Wash. State Republican
Party v. Logan, 377 F. Supp. 2d 907, 932
(W.D. Wash. 2005), and made the injunction
permanent on July 29, 2005. We now affirm
the district court's permanent injunction
because the Initiative 872 primary
unconstitutionally burdens the Washington
state political parties' associational rights by
permitting candidates to identify their party
"preference" on the ballot, notwithstanding
that party's own preference.
II. DISCUSSION
* * *
B. Right of Association
"[T]he freedom to join together in
furtherance of common political beliefs"-
to form and join political parties-falls
squarely within the right of association
protected by the First Amendment and the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment against interference by the
states. Tashjian v. Republican Party of
Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214, 107 S. Ct. 544, 93
L. Ed. 2d 514 (1986); see also NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,
460, 78 S. Ct. 1163, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488
(1958). The right of association protects not
only the activities of party stalwarts who
"devote substantial portions of their lives to
furthering [their party's] political and
organizational goals," but also the more
limited associational ties of those who "limit
their participation [in the party] to casting
their votes for some or all of the [p]arty's
candidates." Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 215.
Indeed, even if "it is made quite easy for a
voter to change his party affiliation the day
of the primary," that eleventh hour
"cross[ing] over" still constitutes an act of
association in that the voter "must formally
become a member of the party." Jones, 530
U.S. at 577 (emphasis omitted).
The principle underlying the breadth of the
right of association is one of mutuality: both
the putative party member and the political
party must consent to the associational tie.
Accordingly, the freedom to associate
necessarily includes some freedom to
exclude others from the association. See id.
at 574. "Freedom of association would
prove an empty guarantee if associations
could not limit control over their decisions
to those who share the interests and
persuasions that underlie the association's
being." Democratic Party of United States v.
Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107. 122 n.22, 67 L.
Ed. 2d 82, 101 S. Ct. 1010 (1981) (quoting
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Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law 791 (1978)). Neither voters nor
political candidates can force a political
party to accept them against the will of the
party. See Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 215 n.6.
Constitutionally permissible state
regulations touching upon political party
affairs include those "requir[ing] parties to
use the primary format for selecting their
nominees, in order to assure that intra-party
competition is resolved in a democratic
fashion," "requir[ing] parties to demonstrate
a significant modicum of support before
allowing their candidates a place on [the
general election] ballot" and "requir[ing]
party registration a reasonable period of time
before a primary election" in order to
prevent "party raiding." Id. (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
Accordingly . . . we must first determine
whether Initiative 872 severely burdens the
Washington political parties' associational
rights; if it does, we must then determine
whether a compelling state interest justifies
that burden and whether Initiative 872 is
narrowly tailored to further that state
interest.
1. Severe Burden
Washington and the Grange contend that
Initiative 872 does not severely burden the
political parties' associational rights. They
point to dictum in Jones discussing with
approval a nonpartisan blanket primary, see
530 U.S. at 585-86, and argue that Initiative
872 created just such a primary. We
disagree, because the primary under
Initiative 872 is not the kind of nonpartisan
election Jones contemplated.
[The Court explains that under a
"nonpartisan blanket" primary system the
State may determine what qualifications it
requires for a candidate to have a place on
the primary ballot, which may include
nomination by established parties. Each
voter, regardless of party affiliation. may
then vote for any candidate without
burdening a political party's First
Amendment right of association.]
Initiative 872 resembles the Jones
hypothetical nonpartisan blanket primary in
some respects, but it differs in at least one
crucial aspect. . . . [T]he crucial point of
divergence between Initiative 872 and Jones
lies in the concept of partisanship.
* * *
The Initiative redefined the concept of
"partisan office," but those offices remain
partisan and so does the primary. By
including candidates' self-identified political
party preferences on the primary ballot,
Washington permits all voters to select
individuals who may effectively become the
parties' standard bearers in the general
election. Whether or not the primary
candidate is a party's nominee, any
candidate may appear on the ballot showing
that party as his or her "preference" and (if
one of the two top vote getters) may emerge
as the only one bearing that designation in
the general election. Whether or not the
party wants to be associated with that
candidate, the party designation is a
powerful, partisan message that voters may
rely upon in casting a vote-in the primary
and in the general election. The Initiative
thus perpetuates the "constitutionally
crucial" flaw Jones found in California's
partisan primary system. Not only does a
candidate's expression of a party preference
on the ballot cause the primary to remain
partisan, but in effect it forces political
parties to be associated with self-identified
candidates not of the parties' choosing. This
constitutes a severe burden upon the parties'
associational rights.
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Washington and the Grange argue against
interpreting the Initiative 872 primary as
partisan, and assert that a party "preference"
is distinguishable from a party "designation"
or some other stronger affirmative indication
of party affiliation, such as membership.
Such a distinction exists as a matter of logic,
but it is not meaningful in the circumstances
of this case. The district court came to the
commonsense conclusion that "[p]arty
affiliation plays a role in determining which
candidates voters select, whether
characterized as 'affiliation' or
'preference."' Wash. State Republican Party
v. Logan, 377 F. Supp. 2d 907, 926 (W.D.
Wash. 2005). Washington urges that a
candidate's political party preference simply
provides "information for the voters." But a
statement of party preference on the ballot is
more than mere voter information. It
represents an expression of partisanship and
occupies a privileged position as the only
information about the candidates that
appears on the primary ballot. Moreover, it
also carries over onto the general election
ballot. Wash. Admin. Code § 434-230-040
(2005).
[The Court explains that voters rely on party
labels on the ballot in deciding for whom to
vote. A party designation, even if only a
"preference," is a powerful voting cue
linking the candidate and the party and is the
most important influence in voting
decisions. Rosen v. Brown, 970 F.2d 169,
172 (6th Cir. 1992).]
Given that the statement of party preference
is the sole indication of political affiliation
shown on the ballot, that statement creates
the impression of associational ties between
the candidate and the preferred party,
irrespective of any actual connection or the
party's desire to distance itself from a
particular candidate. The practical result of a
primary conducted pursuant to Initiative 872
is that a political party's members are
unilaterally associated on an undifferentiated
basis with all candidates who, at their
discretion, "prefer" that party.
* * *
The net effect is that parties do not choose
who associates with them and runs using
their name; that choice is left to the
candidates and forced upon the parties by
the listing of a candidate's name "in
conjunction with" that of the party on the
primary ballot. Wash. Rev. Code §
29A.04.110 (2004). Such an assertion of
association by the candidates against the will
of the parties and their membership
constitutes a severe burden on political
parties' associational rights. See Tashjian,
479 U.S. at 215 n.6; Duke. 954 F.2d at 1531.
In so holding, we do not question a political
candidate's fundamental right to express a
political viewpoint, including a political
preference, more generally. See, e.g.,
Monitor Patriot Co. i. Roy, 401 U.S. 265,
272, 91 S. Ct. 621, 28 L. Ed. 2d 35 (1971).
We are not deciding that an expression of a
party preference other than as a ballot
designation-such as in campaign literature
or advertising, a candidate statement in the
voters' pamphlet or a news conference-
constitutes a forced association between the
candidate stating the preference and the
political party being preferred. Rather, we
are focused on the specific primary election
ballot created by Initiative 872, and the one-
sided expression of party preferences on that
ballot. There is a constitutionally significant
distinction between ballots and other
vehicles for political expression. "Ballots
serve primarily to elect candidates, not as
forums for political expression." Tin2mons,
520 U.S. at 363. Here the ballot
communicates a political association that
may be un-reciprocated and misleading to
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the voters, to the detriment of the political
parties and their bona fide members.
Candidate statements cannot cure Initiative
872's one-sided party-preference labeling on
the primary ballot. As previously discussed,
political parties' names matter; they are
shorthand identifiers that voters traditionally
rely upon to signal a candidate's substantive
and ideological positions. See Rosen, 970
F.2d at 172. For some voters, the party label
may be enough; other voters may seek out
more information about a candidate. As the
Supreme Court observed in Tashjian, "[tlo
the extent that party labels provide a
shorthand designation of the views of party
candidates on matters of public concern, the
identification of candidates with particular
parties plays a role in the process by which
voters inform themselves for the exercise of
the franchise." 479 U.S. at 220....
A party should not be placed in the position
of having to overcome a false association
between itself and a candidate by relying on
the candidate's off-ballot clarifying
statements. See Pac. Gas & Elec.Co. v. Pub.
Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 16, 106
S. Ct. 903, 89 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1986). It is too
much to expect candidate statements to clear
up the confusion engendered by the primary
ballot regarding who is the "real"
Republican, Democratic or Libertarian
standard bearer for his or her respective
party, never mind whom party members
would acknowledge as a fellow member.
We are similarly unconvinced by
Washington's argument that the political
parties' associational rights are not severely
burdened because their inability to indicate
their candidate preference on the primary
ballot is no different from the inability of
other, nonparty organizations, such as labor
unions or better business bureaus, to indicate
their candidate preferences. First,
Washington's argument is undermined by
the fact that Initiative 872 singles out
candidates' political party preferences to be
listed on the primary ballot, but not
preferences with respect to any other
organization. Second, a political party is
historically different from other
organizations with political interests in that
it nominates candidates to run for political
office in the party's name. See Jones, 530
U.S. at 575-77; Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S.
51, 58, 94 S. Ct. 303, 38 L. Ed. 2d 260
(1973) ("Under our political system, a basic
function of a political party is to select the
candidates for public office to be offered to
the voters at general elections."). We
therefore rej ect the premise of an
equivalency between political parties and
other organizations that lies at the heart of
Washington's argument.
In sum, because a party label conveys to
voters "a shorthand designation of the views
of party candidates on matters of public
concern," Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 220,
Initiative 872's party "preference"
designation allows some candidates to create
a mistaken impression of their true
relationship with a political party. That
severe burden on parties' associational
rights is not negated by requiring voters to
rely on candidates' or parties' off-ballot
statements to clarify the nature or even lack
of an actual party association.
2. Compelling State Interest and Narrow
Tailoring
Washington and the Grange have focused
their arguments on appeal on the contention
that Initiative 872 does not severely burden
the political parties' associational rights at
all. They have not articulated any
compelling state interest that justifies such a
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burden. To the extent that we can read
compelling state interests between the lines
of their arguments we conclude that such
interests could be sufficiently served by a
more narrowly tailored primary system. One
obvious approach would be to create a true
nonpartisan primary, such as the one
discussed in Jones, where only a candidate's
name without any party preference or
designation appears on the ballot....
C. Severing Unconstitutional Provisions
As a fallback position, Washington and the
Grange argue that any unconstitutional
provisions in Initiative 872-namely those
that provide for the designation of candidate
party preferences-can be severed from the
rest of the Initiative. [W]e conclude that it is
not possible to sever the constitutionally
deficient portions from the rest of Initiative
872.
[The Court explains that under Washington
Supreme Court precedent an invalid
provision may only be separated if it is
grammatically, functionally, and volitionally
severable. McGowan v. State, 148 Wn.2d
278, 60 P.3d 67. 75 (Wash.2002). Even
assuming grammatical and functional
severability, the invalid portions on
Initiative 872 are not volitionally severable,
because "it cannot be reasonably believed"
that Washington voters would have passed
the remaining portions without the excised
party preference provisions. Id.]
[E]xcising all mentions of party preference
from the modified blanket primary would
transform a partisan primary into a
nonpartisan one. It is not reasonable to
believe that Washington voters would have
passed Initiative 872 if they knew it would
result in nonpartisan primaries for all
statewide offices. Because the party
preference provisions in Initiative 872 do
not pass the volitional severability test in
McGowan, we conclude that Initiative 872
cannot be saved by severing its provisions
for candidate party preferences. We hold
that Initiative 872 is unconstitutional in its
entirety.
III. CONCLUSION
Although the Constitution grants States "a
broad power . . . to regulate the time, place,
and manner of elections [, that power] does
not justify, without more, the abridgement of
fundamental rights, such as . . . the freedom
of political association." Tashjian, 479 U.S.
at 217 (internal citations omitted). A
political party's "determination of the
boundaries of its own association, and of the
structure which best allows it to pursue its
political goals, is protected by the
Constitution." Id. at 224. Initiative 872
severely burdens the Washington political
parties' associational rights by allowing all
candidates to state their party preferences on
the primary ballot. This one-sided statement
of party preferences on the ballot has the
potential to force a political party into an
unwanted association with a candidate who
may be anathema to everything the party
stands for. We hold that Initiative 872 is
unconstitutional in its entirety because the
party preference provisions are not severable
from the rest of Initiative 872 under
Washington law. The judgment of the
district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
421
"High Court to Rule on State Primary"
The Seattle Times
February 27, 2007
Susan Gilmore
In what both sides say is a surprise, the U.S.
Supreme Court has agreed to consider
whether Washington state's voter-approved,
top-two primary is constitutional [in
Washington v. Washington State
Republican Party].
The announcement Monday came nearly
three years after state voters
overwhelmingly passed Initiative 872,
sponsored by the Washington State Grange.
The initiative provided that the two
candidates with the most votes in the
primary would move on to the general
election, regardless of political affiliation.
Federal courts tossed out the new primary
system before it was ever used.
Jim Phanis, an assistant state attorney
general who defended the initiative, said "it
was a long shot" that the Supreme Court
would even take the case.
Pharris said the high court may have decided
to accept the appeal because it also agreed
last week to take an elections case from New
York state, where lower courts threw out
nominating conventions for state judges.
Since 1935, the state had operated under a
"blanket" primary system, where voters
could choose a candidate in the primary
regardless of party label.
But in 2000 the Supreme Court invalidated a
similar blanket-primary law in California,
and in 2003 the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, relying on the California decision,
threw out Washington's blanket primary.
The Supreme Court refused to consider an
appeal of that decision.
After voters approved 1-872, the political
parties went back to federal court and the
top-two primary was tossed out, before it
was ever used.
The parties successfully argued that the top-
two primary infringes on their right to pick
their own nominees for the general election.
Since then, the state has been operating
under a Montana-style primary, which
requires voters to choose a party ballot
before voting.
"We're very pleased," said Tom Ahearne,
the attorney for the Grange in the dispute.
"It allows us to have the Supreme Court
correct the 9th Circuit mistake."
Ahearne said Justice Antonin Scalia, in the
California decision, specifically said a
primary like the top-two system could pass
constitutional muster.
But the state's political parties are convinced
they'll prevail. "We're going to win,
absolutely," said Luke Esser, chairman of
the state Republican Party. "We have the
law, the facts, the common sense.
Everything is on our side."
In a prepared statement, Dwight Pelz,
chairman of Washington State Democrats,
said he's also confident the court will
''uphold the right of political parties to
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choose their own nominees."
Attorneys expect the case will be argued in
October, which means the state will have at
least one more year with a Montana primary.
Secretary of State Sam Reed, who supports
the top-two primary, said he was surprised
the high court agreed to take the case.
"This is encouraging for the voters of the
state who have felt so strongly that they
have a right to vote for the person, not the
party, in the primary and felt this was
fundamental to having the right to control
who their public officials are," Reed said.
The Grange, which sponsored the initial
blanket primary, proposed legislation this
year to make primaries nonpartisan, but the
bill apparently has died.
"People are not happy with the party-
dominated system," said Dan Hammock, a
spokesman for the Grange. "We're really
excited about the fact the Supreme Court is
taking this up."
Washington's Primary History:
1935: Washington adopts a "blanket"
primary that allows voters to pick a favorite
for each office without regard to party label.
The top vote-getter from each party
advances to the November general election.
June 2000: The U.S. Supreme Court
invalidates a similar system adopted by
California. Washington continues to use its
blanket primary, though, when U.S. District
Judge Frank Burgess sides with the state.
September 2003: The 9th U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals overturns Burgess and sides with
the state's political parties.
March 2004: After the high court declined to
hear the state's appeal, lawmakers approved
a top-two primary that allows the top two
vote-getters to advance to the general
election, without regard to party. But it also
included a backup system, a Montana-style
primary that requires voters to limit
themselves to one party's candidates.
April 2004: Gov. Gary Locke vetoes the top-
two part of the bill and leaves the state with
the partisan Montana system.
September 2004: Washington holds its first
Montana-style primary. It proves very
unpopular.
November 2004: Voters approve
872, creating a top-two system,
percent yes vote.
Initiative
by a 60
July 2005: U.S. District Judge Thomas Zilly
throws out the top-two system, saying it
infringes on the political parties' right to
pick their own nominees. That leaves the
Montana plan in place.
August 2006: The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals upholds Zilly's ruling.
Monday: The U.S. Supreme Court agrees to
hear the top-two case.
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"State to Contest Ruling on Primaries"
Columbian
September 23, 2006
David Ammons
OLYMPIA-Washington state is turning to
the U.S. Supreme Court in a last-ditch effort
to save the "Top 2" primary system that
voters created, state Attorney General Rob
McKenna said Friday. [The case is
Washington v. Washington State
Republican Party.]
The Top 2 system would allow voters to
pick their favorite for each office, with the
top two vote-getters advancing to the
November general election, even if they are
from the same party. That system is similar
to the state's popular "blanket" primary that
was declared unconstitutional in a California
case.
After Washington voters approved the Top 2
system as a replacement, via Initiative 872
in 2004, the parties challenged it in federal
courts, asserting a First Amendment right
for the parties to select their own nominees
without outside forces interfering.
U.S. District Judge Thomas Zilly sided with
the parties. The state has been using a voting
system created by the Legislature and then-
Gov. Gary Locke that restricts voters to one
party's ballot.
That system was used this week, and
election officials said voters remain unhappy
with the demise of crossover voting. Many
voters spoiled their ballots by failing to
choose a party.
A three-judge panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals last month agreed with
Zilly and refused to reinstate the Top 2
system, ruling that it infringes on the parties'
constitutional rights.
The Washington State Grange, which
sponsored both the original blanket primary
and the Top 2 initiative, has said it would
appeal that ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court
and try to remove party designations from
future balloting to allow wide-open
primaries. The state's November ballot
allows crossover voting.
On Friday, McKenna said the state will also
give one last try in the federal courts, asking
the high court to take the case on appeal.
"The 9th Circuit decision not only strikes
down the election system selected by the
people of Washington, but leaves the state in
serious doubt as to what options it has in
seeking to craft a primary that meets
constitutional standards while reflecting the
will of the people," McKenna said.
"The Attorney General's Office joins the
Secretary of State's Office in standing
behind the citizen's right to initiative and we
will continue to work to uphold the will of
the people in our state."
In the appeals court's unanimous ruling,
Judge Raymond Fisher wrote of the Top 2
system, "The net effect is the parties do not
choose who associates with them and runs
using their name; that choice is left to the
candidates and forced upon the parties."
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"Parties Take Primary Down
Slippery Slope"
The News Tribune
August 27, 2006
Peter Callaghan
The state's political parties have the full
support of federal judges in their campaign to
take complete control of the primary election.
If only they were as well-received by the
voters.
Last week, the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals dissolved Initiative 872 [in
Washington v. Washington State Republican
Party]. The federal judges said the initiative,
which was approved by 60 percent of the
voters in 2004, infringed on the rights of the
political parties to control who votes and who
runs in the September election.
The initiative created the so-called "top two"
primary, an attempt to regain some of what
was lost when the state's 70-year-old blanket
primary was tossed out in 2003. It said that
the two candidates with the most votes,
regardless of party, would move on to the
general election.
In most cases, that would be one Republican
and one Democrat. But that wasn't to the
liking of the parties so they sued the voters,
again.
Last week's ruling is just the latest in a series
of federal court decisions based on a newly
created line of legal reasoning-that primary
elections are not by and for the voters, but are
really by and for the parties.
So next month we return to the "Montana"
primary where voters who want to vote for
partisan offices must designate on their ballot
which party they identify with and then vote
for only that party's candidates. (In the
November election, voters can vote for
candidates from any party.)
Each voter's choice of party will remain
private, for now. But the parties have said
they want to know which voters choose which
party, and everyone expects that issue be
legislated or litigated next year.
All candidates who filed for office last month
will remain on the September ballot, even
those not endorsed by party leaders. But the
9th Circuit decision clearly agreed with the
party position that only candidates endorsed
by party leaders should be allowed to appear
on partisan ballots.
Once the parties win on this issue, we'll have
a situation in which elected officials can be
pressured to follow the direction of party
leaders. If they refuse, the party could keep
them off the ballot come re-election time.
Party leaders claim they have sued the voters
in order to give each party's voters more
choice. Party officials claimed that under the
old blanket primary, Democrats could help
choose the Republican nominee and
Republicans could help choose the
Democratic nominee. That was the theory,
though no one demonstrated that such
mischief ever affected an election.
Here's what they want: to have voters register
by party, for that list to be public and for the
primary to be restricted to each party's
registered members. They have won the most
significant items on their wish list and say
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they'll fight to get them all.
Why then have both the state Democrats and
Republicans done so much to make sure their
now-segregated primaries don't have
competitive races? If only Republicans can
choose Republican nominees and only
Democrats can choose Democratic nominees,
why do the parties do all they can to make
sure that only a single, anointed candidate is
on the ballot? Why do they harass those who
challenge the hand-picked choice of the
leaders?
The result is that, more often than not, each
party's voters have a choice of one. After this
final use of the Montana primary, where some
mavericks still can get their names before
voters, the parties will have a veto over any
candidate who doesn't pledge loyalty to the
And that's the Big Lie. The party bosses
claim this has been about getting control for
the party's voters when it really has been
about getting control-complete control-for
the leaders.
What's the answer? The 9th Circuit decision
laid it out clearly:
"One obvious approach would be to create a
true nonpartisan primary . . . where only a
candidate's name without any party
preference or designation appears on the
ballot."
The Washington State Grange, the folks who
brought us 1-872, are considering just such an
initiative.
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party leaders.
"Judges Hear Arguments on Primary"
Colunbian
February 7, 2006
Gene Johnson
SEATTLE-Judges from a federal appeals
court grilled lawyers for the attorney
general's office and the Washington State
Grange on Monday over their assertions that
Washington's short-lived "top-two" primary
system should be reinstated.
The top-two system was ruled
unconstitutional last July, before it was used,
by U.S. District Court Judge Thomas Zilly,
who found it infringed upon the right of
political parties to nominate candidates for
office.
The state and the grange appealed Zilly's
decision to a three-judge panel of the 9th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which heard
arguments from them and from the state
Democratic, Republican and Libertarian
parties Monday.
Voters approved the top-two system as
Initiative 872 in 2004, a year after the state's
nearly 70-year-old "blanket primary" was
struck down.
Like the blanket primary, the top-two
system allowed voters to pick their favorite
candidates for each office, regardless of
party.
But instead of the top Republican,
Democratic and third-party candidates
advancing, the top two vote-getters advance
even if they're both Republicans or both
Democrats.
Its much like the state s system for electing
nonpartisan positions, such as judges. except
that the candidates identify their party
preference on the ballot and there's the
problem.
The political parties don't want anyone
except their members picking their standard-
bearer, and they don't want anyone but their
chosen nominee being identified on the
ballot as a party member it's a First
Amendment freedom of association issue.
Under the top-two system, candidates can
call themselves Republicans on the ballot
even if they're not Republicans.
"A candidate has no right to force himself
upon an unwilling party," GOP lawyer John
White told the judges.
Judge Pamela Rymer expressed similar
concern.
"It's a partisan office and yet there's no
opportunity for the party to say in the same
breadth, 'Uh-uh, not our nominee?"' Rymer
asked.
Thomas Ahearne, a lawyer for the grange,
argued that voters understand what is meant
when they see candidates list their "party
preference."
Ahearne said: "My football team preference
is the Seahawks. No one is going to take that
to mean I'm a member of the Seahawks."
Judge Raymond Fisher responded: "I don't
think that's a good analogy." Voters may
understand the language. Fisher said, but
"what is the language on the ballot that
allows them to distinguish between the three
candidates labeled 'R'?"
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The judges suggested, as U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Antonin Scalia has, that the
only way this type of primary could be
constitutional would be if the state made all
of its offices nonpartisan, and candidates did
not list party affiliation on the ballot.
The judges did not indicate when they might
rule. In the meantime, the Montana-style
primary that Washington has used as a
default for the past two elections voters pick
one party's primary ballot and stick to it
remains in place.
[The case is Washington v. Washington
State Republican Party.]
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"Judge Tosses State's New Primary"
The Seattle Times
July 16, 2005
Susan Gilmore
A federal judge tossed out Washington's
new voter-approved primary as
unconstitutional yesterday, leaving voters
with the unpopular version used last year
that requires them to pick a party ballot and
vote only for that party's candidates.
State Attorney General Rob McKenna said
the state will appeal. But it's likely the case
won't be resolved before voters face a so-
called Montana-style primary election in
September.
Voters last November overwhelmingly
approved Initiative 872, creating a top-two
primary system in which the two candidates
with the most votes move on to the general
election, regardless of political affiliation.
In May, the state's political parties sued,
claiming the top-two primary violated their
First Amendment rights to decide which
candidates should carry the party flag in an
general election.
U.S. District Court Judge Thomas Zilly
agreed.
"The implementation of Initiative 872 will
severely burden the First Amendment rights
of Washington's political parties by
allowing any voter, regardless of their
affiliation to a party, to choose a party's
nominee," Zilly said in his 40-page ruling
yesterday.
To get around the new top-two primary, the
parties held recent nominating conventions
to choose candidates for this fall's primary
election ballot. Those selections apparently
won't be needed in light of Zilly's ruling.
"It's going to be a good old-fashioned
primary," said Republican King County
Councilman Reagan Dunn, who lost in the
nominating convention for his County
Council seat but was told yesterday by the
party he now could run as a Republican. "I
think this is a momentum-shifting event."
On the Democratic side, King County
Councilman Bob Ferguson, who won his
party's nominating convention, said much
the same. "From my standpoint, I've already
won the Democratic nomination and I will
again in September," he said. "It doesn't
change my campaign one iota."
County Councilwoman Carolyn Edmonds,
who lost to Ferguson at the convention, had
planned to file as a Democrat with or
without yesterday's court ruling. The
incumbents are facing each other because
redistricting put them in the same district.
"It doesn't change in
campaign," Edmonds said.
any way my
Secretary of State Sam Reed said he was
unhappy with Zilly's ruling. "I'm
disappointed for the people of Washington
who just really believe they have the right to
vote for the best person and not the party,"
said Reed, who backed 1-872.
But Reed said the decision does not spell the
end of the top-two primary. He said Zilly's
ruling "seems to go out of its way" to
indicate that a top-two election system could
be constitutional, but not Washington's
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version that allows candidates to choose a
party preference.
The state's political parties cheered the
ruling.
"I'm pleased but hardly surprised," said
Republican Party Chairman Chris Vance.
"This was a legal slam dunk. The top-two is
clearly and obviously unconstitutional."
He and Democratic Party Chairman Paul
Berendt said they hope the state will now
negotiate with the political parties to find an
agreeable primary system.
"It is well past time for the governor, the
attorney general, the Legislature and the
secretary of state to sit down and enter into
serious negotiations to come up with a
primary system that is constitutional and that
we can all live with," Berendt said.
The state has fought the parties since a U.S.
Supreme Court ruling five years ago that
tossed out California's so-called blanket
primary, which was similar to Washington's
at the time.
Berendt said the parties only want to bring
Washington state's primary in line with
nearly every other state in the country.
"What the judge did is he affirmed our right
to choose our nominees and choose the
individuals who represent our party on the
ballot," he said.
In his ruling, Zilly said, "a political party
does not have a constitutional right to have
its candidate on the general election ballot;
however, it does have a constitutional right
to nominate its standard bearer."
Tom Ahearne, attorney for the Washington
State Grange. which wrote 1-872 and joined
the state in defending it, said the Grange
also will appeal to the 9th U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals.
"Zilly is a good judge, but in this case I
think the decision was incorrect," Ahearne
said.
"The U.S. Supreme Court indicated in 2000
that states could create top-two primaries
that would be independent and not interfere
with the association rights of political
parties," Grange President Terry Hunt said.
"The initiative was drafted to meet that
standard."
Ahearne said he hopes either Zilly or the 9th
Circuit will stay yesterday's ruling during
the appeal, which would mean a top-two
primary could be used this September.
Assistant Attorney General Jim Pharris, who
represented the state in the case, said he was
disappointed by the decision.
"If we can't conduct a top-two, probably
redoing Montana is better than anything
else," Pharris said. "We can't go back to the
blanket primary or start over and make up a
whole new system."
For more than 65 years, Washington voters
chose their candidates through a blanket
primary, which allowed voters to vote for
any candidate, regardless of their party. The
top vote-getter from each party advanced to
the general election.
But the courts said such primaries infringed
on the rights of the parties to decide who
runs for office under their labels.
Last fall, the state used the Montana-style
primary, which required voters to select one
party ballot and vote only for that party's
candidates. That system was replaced in
430
November by 1-872, which passed with 60
percent of the vote.
Zilly's order said the state would return to
the Montana-style primary. He wrote:
"The law as it existed before the passage of
Initiative 872, including the Montana
primary system, stands as if Initiative 872
had never been approved."
He said the state and the Washington State
Grange can file objections by July 27. The
court then will rule on a permanent
injunction against 1-872.
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"Initiative 872: Top 2 Primary"
Seattle Post-Intelligencer
October 20, 2004
What It Would Do
Change Washington's primary election to a
Louisiana-style "top two" system in which
all candidates for every partisan office-
including major party, minor party and
independent candidates-would appear
together on the primary ballot. The two
receiving the most votes would advance to
the general election, even if both belong to
the same political party.
Allow primary candidates to state a party
preference or declare themselves
independents on the ballot. Permit voters to
choose a candidate of any party, as in the
former blanket primary. Leave general
elections unchanged.
Actual Ballot Question
"Initiative Measure No. 872 concerns
elections for partisan offices. This measure
would allow voters to select among all
candidates in a primary. Ballots would
indicate candidates' party preference. The
two candidates receiving most votes
advance to the general election, regardless
of party. Should this measure be enacted
into law?"
Change from Current Law
The current law limits a voter's choices to
candidates of a single party-Democratic,
Republican or Libertarian-for partisan
offices. If a voter chooses not to select any
partys ballot, he is allowed to vote only on
non-partisan offices and ballot measures.
The law does not require party registration
or a record of a voter's party preference.
The U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals last
year declared Washington's former
"blanket" primary unconstitutional. The
state's Democratic, Republican and
Libertarian parties had sued, arguing that the
blanket primary violated their First
Amendment right of free association by
allowing voters to select candidates from
any party.
Gov. Gary Locke's partial veto of a primary
election bill passed by the Legislature left
the state with the new primary system, used
for the first time Sept. 14. Locke vetoed a
section of the bill that would have given the
state a "top two" primary instead.
Budget Impact
The state Office of Financial Management
estimates that the "top two" system could
save as much as $6 million a year for state
and county election administrators compared
with the current system. The state
reimburses counties for odd-year primary
election costs and would share the savings.
One-time costs for public education and
voter notification of changes could cost the
state $1.3 million.
Arguments for
Washington voters should have the right to
select any candidate in the primary instead
of being forced to choose from only one
party's slate of primary candidates. The "top
two" primary will give the voters a broader
range of choices and reduce control of the
elections by the political parties.
Since the two candidates with the most votes
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in the primary would advance to the general
election, regardless of party, no political
party is guaranteed a place on the general
election ballot. That will encourage the
parties to recruit candidates with broad
public support.
Arguments Against
Adoption of the initiative would mean two
candidates of the same party sometimes
would appear on the general election ballot
and one party wouldn't be represented. Had
1-872 been law, John Spellman, the
successful 1980 Republican nominee for
governor, wouldn't even have qualified for
the general election ballot. And in 1996,
both gubernatorial candidates in the general
election would have been Democrats.
The general election ballot would be
restricted almost exclusively to Democrats
and Republicans. Third-party and
independent candidates would almost
always be eliminated from the November
ballot because they rarely would be among
the top two vote-getters in the primary.
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LOOKING BACK: FEC v. WISCONSIN RIGHT TO LIFE
"Justices Loosen Ad Restrictions in Campaign Law"
The New York Times
June 26, 2007
Linda Greenhouse and David D. Kirkpatrick
The Supreme Court on Monday took a sharp
turn away from campaign finance
regulation, opening a wide exception to the
advertising restrictions that it upheld when
the McCain-Feingold law first came before
it four years ago.
In a splintered 5-to-4 decision, Chief Justice
John G. Roberts Jr. said that as interpreted
broadly by federal regulators and the law's
supporters, the restrictions on television
advertisements paid for from corporate or
union treasuries in the weeks before an
election amounted to censorship of core
political speech unless those advertisements
explicitly urge a vote for or against a
particular candidate.
"Where the First Amendment is implicated,"
the chief justice said, "the tie goes to the
speaker, not the censor."
Consequently, Chief Justice Roberts said,
the only advertisements that can be kept off
the air in the pre-election period covered by
the law-the 30 days before a primary
election and the 60 days before a general
election-are those that are "susceptible of
no reasonable interpretation other than as an
appeal to vote for or against a specific
candidate."
Describing and then dismissing the rationale
for the advertising restrictions, Chief Justice
Roberts used a phrase that seemed to sum up
the new majority's view toward campaign
finance regulation. "Enough is enough," the
chief justice said.
The decision was a reminder of the ways in
which the justices appointed by President
Bush are moving the court. While Chief
Justice Roberts's predecessor, Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, was a dissenter when
the court upheld the law four years ago,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was in the 5-
to-4 majority. Her successor, Justice Samuel
A. Alito Jr., voted with Chief Justice
Roberts on Monday, and in fact was the only
justice to join his opinion fully.
Two other closely divided rulings
announced on Monday also showed the
influence of the new justices. The court
limited student speech and ruled that
taxpayers do not have standing to challenge
the administration's program of support for
social service programs offered by religious
institutions.
Coming as the 2008 presidential race takes
off, the campaign finance decision has the
effect of jettisoning a major part of the
McCain-Feingold law, which Congress
passed in 2002 to curb the flow of
unregulated "soft money" into federal
election campaigns.
While the decision did not deal directly with
the soft-money ban, which is in a separate
section of the law, election experts said the
effect would be to undercut the soft-money
section as well by permitting a largely
unlimited flow of money from corporate
treasuries to pay for the all-important
broadcast advertisements in the weeks
before primary and general elections.
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Groups seeking to influence the outcome of
the election could easily sidestep the
prohibition on explicit appeals for or against
candidates, supporters of the law said.
It is not clear which candidate or party is
more likely to benefit from the ruling in
2008. But Senator John McCain, the
Arizona Republican seeking his party's
presidential nomination, may suffer the most
in the short term. His sponsorship of the law,
formally called the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act, is unpopular with conservatives
and Republican primary voters, and the
Supreme Court's decision is a reminder of
his role.
Although the court's five most conservative
justices voted in the majority and the four
more liberal justices were the dissenters, the
outcome was not easy to categorize simply
along ideological lines. Both sides of the
campaign finance debate have always
attracted unusual coalitions. Chief Justice
Roberts pointed out in his opinion that
among the groups supporting the challenge
to the law, which was brought by the
Wisconsin Right to Life, were the American
Civil Liberties Union and the A.F.L.-C.I.O.,
as well as the United States Chamber of
Commerce and the National Rifle
Association.
The dissenters, Justices David H. Souter,
John Paul Stevens. Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and Stephen G. Breyer, said the decision
stood the court's earlier interpretation of the
statute "on its head" and would invite the
"easv circumvention" of the sponsors'
purpose.
The dissenters' argument that the court had
effectively overruled its 2003 decision in
M1IcConnell v. Federal Election Commission,
presented in an opinion by Justice Souter,
found agreement among election law
experts.
"Corporations received the victory that they
did not achieve in 2003," said Edward B.
Foley, a professor at the Moritz College of
Law at Ohio State University.
It may be only a matter of time before the
court reconsiders its 2003 decision
upholding the constitutionality of the entire
law, or at least expands its Monday decision
to strike down any restriction on advertising.
Three of the five justices in the majority,
Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy and
Clarence Thomas, declined to sign the chief
justice's opinion because it did not take that
step.
In fact, Justice Scalia, in a footnote to his
separate opinion, agreed with the dissenters
that the court has in effect already reversed
the 2003 decision when it came to the
advertising restriction. The decision changed
the law so substantially that it "effectively
overrules" the 2003 decision "without
saying so," Justice Scalia said. And
demonstrating that he does not consider the
new chief justice immune from the insults
for which his opinions are famous, he
added: "This faux judicial restraint is
judicial obfuscation."
Justice Alito indicated in a separate opinion
that he, too, would be open to reconsidering
the earlier decision, as "we will presumably
be asked in a future case" to do.
Legal experts and political advocates said
the ruling, Federal Election Commission v.
Wisconsin Right to Life Inc., No. 06-969,
represented a swing back from a tighter
approach toward regulating political
contributions that peaked with passage of
the 2002 law.
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Congress enacted the law in part in reaction
to a flood of special interest money into both
parties. Throughout the 1990s, both parties
had aggressively courted contributions to
their allied party committees from
corporations, unions and wealthy individuals
for the express purpose of winning elections.
These donations, known as soft money, thus
circumvented the limits on campaign
contributions under older campaign laws.
The McCain-Feingold law sought to end the
use of soft money in part by barring
corporations and unions from contributing to
parties or political action committees.
The new decision brings back soft money,
said Kenneth A. Gross, a Washington
lawyer who represents corporations in
election law matters. "The significance of it
is, you can use soft money to do these ads,"
he said. "This is a clear shot over the bow by
this court that there is going to be less
regulation of money in politics. The fulcrum
has now shifted."
It remains to be seen how the Federal
Election Commission applies the new ruling.
The decision held that Wisconsin Right to
Life had a constitutional right to run three
television commercials in 2004 that
criticized Senator Russ Feingold, Democrat
of Wisconsin, for helping to block Mr.
Bush's judicial nominees. Contact the
senator, the commercials said.
Wisconsin Right to Life conceded that the
advertisements were prohibited by the
statute because they named Mr. Feingold,
who was seeking re-election; were intended
to reach Wisconsin voters; and were to run
during the law's 30-day blackout period
before the primary. So the question was
whether they were nonetheless permitted by
the. First Amendment, as a special three-
judge Federal District Court here held that
they were. The decision on Monday upheld
that ruling.
In its decision in 2003, the Supreme Court
ruled that the advertising restriction was not
unconstitutional "on its face." Although
many assumed that the ruling ended the
matter, James Bopp Jr., Wisconsin Right to
Life's counsel, pressed for the right to
challenge the restriction "as applied" to his
group and others like it, which he said were
engaged in constitutionally protected issue
advocacy, albeit with corporate
contributions.
In its last term, the Supreme Court gave the
go-ahead for "as applied" challenges, a
signal that the court might soon be taking a
different view of the law.
The law's supporters, including Fred
Wertheimer, a longtime advocate of tighter
campaign laws, asserted on Monday that a
remaining part of the law, prohibiting
federal officials from soliciting soft money,
was still extremely important.
Mr. McCain agreed. While calling the
decision "regrettable." he pointed out that
the solicitation ban was unaffected.
"Fortunately, that central reform still stands
as the law." he said.
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"Shackles Off 'Issue Ads' Naming Candidates,
but Who Benefits up for Debate"
USA Today
June 26, 2007
Richard Wolf and David Jackson
If you think there are too many political ads
on TV, just wait: There's even more to
come.
The Supreme Court eased restrictions
Monday on the types of ads that special
interest groups can broadcast in the final
days before an election. The ruling will
allow labor. business and other groups to air
"issue ads" that mention candidates by
name, a practice banned by a 2002 law.
"It leaves the door open for many issue
advocacy groups to be active players," says
Kareem Crayton, an election-law expert at
the University of Southern California. The
court "basically gave a road map to putting
out ads."
Who will benefit is anyone's guess. The
2002 provision was challenged by
Wisconsin Right to Life, but liberal groups
such as the AFL-CIO also oppose its free-
speech restrictions. In addition, many groups
have spent more in recent years on get-out-
the-vote efforts, leaving less money
available for TV and radio ads.
Still, liberal and conservative groups now
can advertise more heavily in the 30 days
before next year's presidential primaries and
60 days before the general election-
beginning this year before the Iowa caucuses
and New Hampshire primary in January.
Arizona Sen. John McCain, a presidential
candidate who has been attacked by his
Republican rivals for co-sponsoring the
2002 campaign-finance law, called the
ruling "regrettable." Former Massachusetts
governor Mitt Romney, a rival, hailed it for
rejecting a part of the law that "trampled the
basic right of the American people to
participate in their democracy."
In the last 60 days before the 2000 elections,
interest groups spent more than $38 million
on TV ads, according to a study by the
Brennan Center for Justice at New York
University's School of Law.
Four years later, after enactment of the
campaign-finance overhaul, interest groups
played a less significant role on TV. They
bought 45,000 ads within 60 days of the
2004 election, down from 60,000 in 2000,
according to Michael Franz, Joel Rivlin and
Kenneth Goldstein in the book The Election
After Reform.
Now the shackles will come off. "It's going
to allow the great majority of issue ads to go
forward," says James Bopp, who
represented Wisconsin Right to Life.
Laurence Gold, an election attorney for the
AFL-CIO, calls the ruling "a breath of
constitutional fresh air." He says it's not
clear which end of the political spectrum
will benefit most. "This is an expensive
proposition to do these ads," he says.
Jan Baran, who represents the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, says unions might benefit
more than business because industry "tends
to be very careful and not quite as
aggressive as organized labor when it comes
to political action."
437
Proponents of campaign- finance restrictions
said the decision will further empower
interest groups over individual voters. "It
makes it virtually impossible to regulate
sham issue ads," says Am Pearson,
campaign reform director at Common
Cause.
Ellen Miller, a
campaign-finance
longtime
changes,
advocate of
predicted a
"Wild West" of competing ads that "could
take the outcome of the elections out of the
hands of the candidates."
Craig Holman of Public Citizen, a consumer
group that backs the 2002 law, said the
decision will sow confusion over what ads
are legal. "The Supreme Court's done
everybody a disservice," he said.
438
"FEC to Write a 'WRTL Rule"'
SCOTUSblog
July 18, 2007
Lyle Denniston
The Federal Elections Commission on
Thursday announced that it will write a new
rule to "incorporate the Supreme Court
decision [in the WRTL case} into the
Commission's Regulations." FEC Chairman
Robert Lenhard was quoted as saying that
the Commission "intends to make clear how
we are interpreting this exemption before
mid-December, when the electioneering
communication timeframes for the 2008
campaign will begin.. We believe it is
critical to have a clear rule in place in time
for the Presidential primaries and caucuses
in early 2008." A notice of proposed
rulemaking will be prepared next month, the
FEC said.
Continuing to move to nail down a Supreme
Court victory on broadcasting ads during
political seasons, lawyers for Wisconsin
Right to Life on Wednesday asked the
Federal Election Commission to write into
its rules the definition of protected ads that
the Supreme Court laid down in FEC v.
Wisconsin Right to Life. The petition for
rulemaking can be found here.
The major test case on the right to broadcast
ads during election season appears to be at
its end, after the Federal Election
Commission and four members of Congress
joined in a plea to find the ads at issue to be
constitutionally protected. In a joint motion
filed Wednesday, Wisconsin Right to Life,
an advocacy group that opposes abortion,
along with the FEC and the lawmakers
urged a three-judge U.S. District Court to
rule that a 2006 ad campaign could not be
banned under the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act's "electioneering
communications" ban. That ban applies to
ads during election periods when the ad
names an individual then running for federal
office.
The Supreme Court, in FEC v. Wisconsin
Right to Life, ruled on June 25 that three ads
that WRTL had wanted to run in 2004 were
protected by the First Amendment. The
Court laid down a new, more relaxed
standard for constitutional protection for ads
the FEC thought were covered by BCRA's
ban. The Court sent the case back to District
Court to rule on a separate ad campaign,
planned for 2006. That was the ad that was
at issue in the joint motion. . ..
... As part of the joint motion, the parties
agreed that the District Court should deny
WRTL's requests for different forms of
legal relief in the case.
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"The Right to Spend"
The New York Times
July 8, 2007
Jeffrey Rosen
American democracy has always been
haunted by the specter of concentrated
wealth. How can the principle of one man,
one vote be honored when the accumulation
of dollars translates so readily into the
accumulation of political influence? If all
citizens enjoy the equal right to participate
in politics with their wallets, is it possible to
hold a fair election? In today's proudly
money-mad, winner-take-all economy, these
questions are as urgent as ever. The
spending patterns of the very rich help form
our consumer habits and fill the pages of our
magazines; it's little wonder that they shape
our politics as well. The ongoing
presidential campaign often seems to be a
(somewhat) glorified competition for cash,
and when a billionaire contemplates a
candidacy. the entire process comes to a
halt.
The McCain-Feingold act, passed in 2002,
was meant to do something about this; it was
meant to even the balance between
democracy and money By limiting the
donation of unregulated "soft" money to
political parties and banning "issue ads" in
the buildup to an election, it made it harder
for a small number of wealthy donors to
dominate the political process. Now,
however, the Supreme Court has used the
First Amendment to throw out one part of
the law and threatened to discard the rest. In
this new gilded age, are we doomed to
return to gilded-age politics?
Certainly, the end of McCain-Feingold
would have consequences. The ban on soft
money addressed a serious political problem
about wealth and political access: more than
half of the $500 million in soft money raised
in 2000 came from only 800 donors, each
contributing a minimum of $120,000. Fully
435 of them were corporations or unions,
and the rest were among the wealthiest 1
percent of individual citizens. Under
McCain-Feingold, the influence of those
donors has been reduced. Despite the rise of
so-called 527 organizations to exploit
loopholes in the law, the ban on corporate
soft-money contributions to political parties
has had some success. Candidates are
relieved that they do not have to help solicit
corporate soft money, as they did during the
fund-raising scandals of the go-go '90s, and
corporations are relieved at not being shaken
down to contribute to both parties to hedge
their bets. More important, banning soft
money has forced the parties and candidates
to learn to raise money from individuals
who are not among the superrich, and the
Internet has allowed them to do so in cost-
effective ways. In the first half of 2007,
Barack Obama received contributions from
more than 250,000 individuals while raising
millions over the Internet.
But the Roberts Court may not allow the ban
on soft money to stand for long. Although
four liberal justices, following the thinking
of Stephen Breyer, have concluded that
campaign-finance laws serve the purposes of
the First Amendment by enhancing public
confidence in democracy and equalizing
political participation, four conservative
justices have reached the opposite
conclusion on the grounds that giving
money is a form of speech. And Chief
Justice Roberts may well join them in a
future case. So let's imagine that the court
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votes before long to strike down the ban on
soft money, gutting what remains of
McCain-Feingold. What would American
politics look like then?
In some ways, it would look a lot like
American politics before the 1970s.
Corporations would give freely to state and
national parties. The effects of wealth would
once more be magnified as the size of
donations ballooned. But not all of the
effects of radical deregulation would be
negative. Mega-rich candidates would face
better-financed rivals and thus inspire less
fear. And, having discovered the virtues of
Internet fund-raising, candidates are unlikely
to ignore small donors, as they did in
the '90s.
The most significant result of a decision to
strike down virtually all campaign-finance
regulations would be to dash reformers'
hopes for more comprehensive reform-
hope, that is, for the sort of policies that
proponents of equal. access in politics
believe would actually work. In Belgium,
for example, parties receive 85 percent of
their revenue from the government, and
spending is strictly restricted during the
three months before an election. Such an
approach, however, would be hard to
reconcile with Americans' dislike of
subsidizing politicians-or with our First
Amendment tradition, whether interpreted
by the Warren Court or the Roberts Court.
The larger question, of course, is whether
it's useful for the country to have yet
another polarized debate about whether
giving money is free speech. The truth is
that few people are absolutists on the
question. No less an egalitarian than the
political theorist Michael Walzer, who
supports a "radical ban on private fund-
raising," has suggested that candidates
should at least be allowed to hold bake sales.
And free-speech conservatives, who care
more about liberty than equality in the
political process, haven't yet questioned the
ban on direct corporate contributions to
candidates, which dates back to the
Progressive era. Since 1976, the Supreme
Court has tried to finesse this debate. It has
insisted that Congress can regulate
contributions to candidates more extensively
than expenditures by candidates, because
contributions are more likely to lead to quid
pro quo corruption and are less central to
free expression. But now the court seems on
the verge of throwing out this nuanced
position and announcing that because money
is almost always speech, it can almost never
be regulated. That's a plausible vision of the
First Amendment, but whether it will
produce a political system that inspires
confidence among the American people
remains to be seen.
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"Polarizing Campaign Finance Law"
The National Journal
June 30, 2007
Stuart Taylor Jr.
The most remarkable aspect of the Supreme
Court's big 5-4 decision on June 25 easing
restrictions on corporate campaign spending
has gone virtually unnoticed: Like Congress,
the Court is so ideologically polarized that
even when a principled, pragmatic,
nonideological solution to a knotty problem
was staring them in the face, all nine justices
spurned it.
The knotty problem was that Congress, in
the "issue ad" provision of the 2002
McCain-Feingold campaign finance law,
had joined a legitimate goal with an
illegitimate one.
The legitimate goal was to prevent business
corporations-which have no mandate from
their ideologically eclectic stockholders to
use their money to meddle in election
campaigns-from doing just that.
The illegitimate goal was to censor criticism
of elected federal officials (along with other
candidates) by nonprofit citizens advocacy
groups-ranging from the National Rifle
Association to the Sierra Club-whose
members pay dues and band together
precisely for the purpose of promoting
political causes near and dear to them.
Congress quite deliberately, and cynically,
accomplished both goals in the same
provision (Section 203) by the simple and
stealthy expedient of making it a federal
crime for any corporation (excepting media
corporations) to pay for a broadcast ad that
refers to any federal candidate during the
run-up to an election.
Because nearly all nonprofit advocacy
groups are incorporated, the effect was to
extend to such groups a ban ostensibly
aimed at companies like General Electric
and Dow Chemical. Indeed, it was the
nonprofit citizens groups, not Big Business,
that had bought many or most of the attack
ads that legislators so resent.
Congress thereby made a mockery of the
First Amendment's injunction that
"Congress shall make no law . . . bridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the
right of the people . . . to petition the
government for a redress of grievances."
These provisions were intended above all to
guarantee citizens (and groups of citizens)
the same right to criticize incumbent
officeholders that Section 203 restricts.
The ideal solution would have been for the
Supreme Court to uphold the ad ban as
applied to business corporations and to carve
out an exception for nonprofit advocacy
groups.
How many justices proposed doing that?
Not one. Instead, in FEC v. Wisconsin Right
to Life Inc., the five conservatives in the
majority and the four liberal dissenters alike
focused on all-or-nothing arguments treating
all corporations as fungible.
I discussed the flaws of this approach in my
April 28 column. But such is the fog of
complexity surrounding this issue that my
arguments are worth revisiting now that the
justices have once again made a hash of it. It
is also worth explaining how Congress
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sneaked censorship of advocacy groups into
a law masquerading as a curb on Big
Business and Big Labor.
(The same fog of complexity also prompts
me to confess to oversimplification: I will
not explain how the majority justices
splintered into three separate opinions; why
the exemption of political action committees
from the issue-ad ban alleviates the burden
on citizens groups far less than that on
business corporations and unions; or the
important difference between campaign
contributions and independent campaign
spending.)
Some background: Recognizing that
business corporations amass vast sums
invested by shareholders who (in most
cases) do not intend that their money be
spent on election campaigns-and that such
sums can be used corruptly as quasi-bribes
to buy influence-Congress has banned
corporate contributions to federal candidates
for 100 years. The Court has never
questioned this ban. But until McCain-
Feingold, corporations were free to spend
money on so-called issue ads, meaning ads
designed to persuade voters to pressure their
representatives to support or oppose
legislative measures.
The main reason for this distinction was that
issue ads did not have the same potential to
buy politicians as campaign contributions
(or even independent campaign
expenditures). But it is impossible to draw a
clear line between issue ads and campaign
spending. Especially during the 1990s,
companies and citizens groups alike spent
many millions on broadcast ads-dubbed
"sham issue ads" by critics-that also had
the purpose or effect of persuading viewers
to vote for or against identified candidates.
The radio ads that Wisconsin Right to Life
wanted to run in 2004, for example, urged
viewers to "contact Senators Feingold and
Kohl [both Wisconsin Democrats] and tell
them to oppose the filibuster" of some of
President Bush's judicial nominees. This
was an issue ad because the group no doubt
wanted the filibuster to stop. But it was also
intended to persuade viewers to vote against
Feingold, who was up for re-election.
Indeed, in the 1990s issue ads became a way
for business corporations as well as some
nonprofits to circumvent the restrictions on
corporate campaign spending. By the same
token, criminalizing such circumvention
would inevitably chill genuine issue
advertising as well. And that's what
Congress chose to do in Section 203's ban
on pre-election broadcast ads that refer to
candidates.
Many members recognized that no
justification existed for extending this ban to
nonprofit citizens advocacy groups. So the
Senate adopted the so-called Snowe-Jeffords
amendment to allow such groups to buy
issue ads so long as they used only
membership dues and contributions and thus
avoided serving as conduits for business or
union money.
But then the late Sen. Paul Wellstone,
D-Minn., proposed an amendment to
override Snowe-Jeffords and censor
nonprofit advocacy groups too. Supporters
of this amendment made it clear, by railing
against "negative attack ads," that their goal
was not to prevent corruption but to stop
citizens groups such as the NRA from
criticizing them.
A different bunch of (mostly Republican)
senators-who opposed all curbs on issue
ads, and perhaps wanted to gain support for
their own campaigns in the form of
business-funded or union-funded issue
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ads-cynically put the Wellstone
amendment over the top. These senators
believed (and McCain-Feingold's sponsors
warned) that it was so obviously
unconstitutional that it would provoke the
Supreme Court to strike down the entire
issue-ad provision.
They guessed wrong. In the first ruling on
Section 203, in 2003, all nine justices
ignored both the unsavory history of the
Wellstone amendment and the large
distinction between citizens groups and
business corporations. By 5-4, the Court
upheld the issue-ad ban across the board.
Then, in the June 25 decision, again by 5-4,
the justices went the other way, all but
overruling the 2003 decision and rendering
Section 203's issue-ad ban unenforceable
across the board. This sharp shift reflected
the replacement of Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, who (to the surprise of many)
wrote the 2003 decision, by Justice Samuel
Alito, who voted with the majority in the
new decision.
The two decisions had one thing in
common: All nine justices ignored the
Wellstone amendment and took an all-or-
nothing approach, lumping nonprofit
citizens groups together with corporations
such as General Electric and Dow Chemical.
You might think that somebody on the Court
would have looked for a way to salvage the
sensible restrictions on business
corporations and unions while striking down
Congress's cynical imposition of the same
restrictions on nonprofit advocacy groups.
But nobody did. Why not?
One reason was the facts of the case:
Wisconsin Right to Life had spent business
contributions along with members' dues on
its issue ads and made common cause with
business corporations; this enabled its
adversaries to portray the group as a conduit.
Another reason was that the Court's
precedents have usually (if not always
wisely) recognized no distinction between
the free-speech rights of business
corporations and those of individuals and
citizens groups.
But the main reason for the all-or-nothing
approach of justices on both sides, in my
view, was the same ideological polarization
that obstructs pragmatic compromise in
Congress.
While the majority justices noted in passing
the ad ban's special burdens on nonprofit
advocacy groups, they proceeded to gut
Section 203 as it applied to business
corporations. They thus fetishized corporate
free-speech rights to the point of opening the
door wide to business corporations (and
unions) that seek to misuse shareholders'
(and workers') money to buy political
influence.
And although the four liberal dissenters
stressed the need to curb "the corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations
of wealth" on campaigns, they also
unhesitatingly blessed Section 203's
censorship of citizens groups. They are so
determined to uphold any and all curbs on
big money in politics that they are willing to
throw the free-speech baby out with the
bathwater.
Not all liberals are so blinkered. "Here.
Congress has passed a law under which, for
example, it can be a federal crime for the
ACLU to spend money criticizing members
of Congress," wrote Walter Dellinger, the
former acting solicitor general, in Slate.
"How can that possibly not raise a most
profound constitutional issue?"
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VOTER IDENTIFICATION
Seeking Cert in Voter ID Suit"
The Indiana Lawyer
May 30, 2007
Michael W. Hoskins
Indiana's two-year-old voter identification
law is on its way to the United States
Supreme Court.
That's the hope, at least.
The American Civil Liberties Union of
Indiana and Indiana Democratic Party decided
separately May 16 to seek certiorari in the
case. Petitions are due in July, and the
nation's highest court could make a decision
when term begins in October.
With a great deal of actual and anticipated
litigation nationwide involving
constitutionality of voter identification laws,
civil rights and election attorneys as well as
those in legal academia say this could be a
case where the top court can provide what is
described as much-needed guidance in this
area of the law.
This issue of voter ID laws is sweeping the
nation and isn't going away, and one of these
cases will have to make it to the court at some
point, said Michael Pitts, a law professor at
Indiana University School of Law-
Indianapolis. We're not one of the first places
that springs to mind on this issue, but Indiana
is on the map for this, and this case is one that
has great potential and could be one for the
21st century.
Banter about the Hoosier suit's trek upstairs
has circled since April 5 when the 7th Circuit
Court of Appeals in Chicago declined to
rehear Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board, et al., No 06-2218, en banc. The suit
challenged the state's new identification law
that went into effect in July 2005.
That ruling was the latest in the legal scuffle
initiated by Rep. William Crawford,
D-Indianapolis, against Secretary of State
Todd Rokita and the Marion County Election
Board. ACLU of Indiana had sued on behalf
of those who could be impacted by the law,
possibly to the extent of not voting.
Opponents argued that the law would unfairly
target people who might have trouble getting
an ID, but U.S. District Judge Sarah Evans
Barker in April 2006 ruled the law doesn't
infringe on anyone's right to cast a ballot. Her
ruling said opponents had not produced
evidence of a single person who would not be
able to vote under the law.
The federal Circuit Court upheld her ruling
and the state law in a decision released Jan. 4,
with one of the three panelists-Judge
Terrence Evans-disagreeing. In that opinion,
he wrote in a strongly worded dissent that the
state law is a not-too-thinly-veiled attempt to
discourage election-day turnout by certain
folks believed to skew Democratic. .. The
potential for mischief with this law is
obvious. He also wrote the court should
strictly scrutinize the law and strike it down
as an undue burden on the fundamental right
to vote.
While Circuit judges Richard Posner and
Diane Sykes agreed to affirm the Indianapolis
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ruling earlier this year, Judge Evans was
recently joined by three other Circuit judges
in the en banc denial. In a dissenting opinion,
four of the 11 active Circuit judges wrote that
the case addresses an exceptionally important,
unresolved question of law: What level of
scrutiny should courts use when evaluating
mandatory voter identification laws?
The judges recognized that recent national
election history-the 2000 presidential race-
shows that disenfranchising even a tiny
percentage of voters can be enough to swing
election outcomes.
[T]his court should not ignore this country's
history, Judge Diane Wood wrote.
Unfortunately, voting regulations have been
used in the not-so-distant past for
discriminatory reasons. The law challenged in
this case will harm an identifiable and often
marginalized group of voters to some
undetermined degree. This court should take
significant care, including satisfactorily
considering the motives behind such a law,
before discounting such an inquiry.
ACLU of Indiana's legal director Ken Falk
and Indiana Democratic Party counsel
William Groth have spent the past two
months researching similar cases nationwide
and are aware of court challenges across the
country, including ones going on in Georgia
and Arizona. Other states, such as Texas, are
currently debating passing similar laws.
Many states are trying to adopt these ID-
based requirements, and this is an issue that's
being litigated across the country, Falk said.
It's something that will get up there at some
point.
Groth said the parties are still thinking about
issues that will be included in the petition, but
they strongly believe this case is cert-worthy
and will highlight issues touching on voting
rights, political maneuvering, and the recent
U.S. attorney-firing debate.
This Indiana case has intriguing ties into
national controversies such as how at least
two of the eight fired district attorneys were
replaced because of their unwillingness to
prosecute in voter fraud cases, Groth said.
One of the discouraging things as a lawyer is
that this whole issue of voter ID fraud is
essentially politically motivated, he said. If
evidence had been presented to the lower
court showing that there's fraudulent voting
or a widespread problem, this (law) might be
justifiable. But the evidence isn't there.
Legal scholars and court-watchers point to the
underlying issue in this case as one that
extends beyond the voter ID realm and could
be significant enough for the nation's highest
court to consider. However, some within the
legal community's academia also question
whether this is the best case for voter
identification opponents to try to take
upstairs, as the District Court record may not
be strong enough to sufficiently challenge the
state law.
One issue is whether plaintiffs in this case
presented a strong enough case on the
evidence that the Indiana law would actually
burden many voters. The District Court and
7th Circuit opinions make it seem as though
there is very little evidence. Evidence can be
found in Judge Posner's writing where he
refers to this as something remarkable in the
case.
No doubt that there are at least a few such
people in Indiana, but the inability of the
sponsors of this litigation to find any such
person to join as a plaintiff suggests that the
motivation for the suit is simply that the law
may require Democratic Party and the other
organizational plaintiffs to work harder to get
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every last one of their supporters to the polls,
he wrote.
After consulting election experts nationwide,
Groth said he has observed a consensus that
Judge Posner misread the Supreme Court's
precedence requiring greater scrutiny on these
cases.
Judge Posner makes comments that are
almost disparaging about the right to vote and
its importance, he said. Many are fearful that
it would send bad signals to other courts that
this right is no longer viewed in that light.
The consensus was that Judge Posner's
decision was so far out of the mainstream, and
he's such an influential jurist, that it's
important to take this to the Supreme Court.
Law school professor Richard Hasen at
Loyola Law School in Los Angeles-who
Hoosier colleagues consider an expert on
election-law issues-notes that a stronger
case might challenge a state whose law lacks
an indigency exemption.
But he speculated the high court would likely
take the case because of its issues and the
possibility to re-examine an issue it last
touched on in October. Weeks before the
general election, the court issued a ruling in
Purcell v. Gonzales that vacated an injunction
against Arizona rules requiring citizenships
and identification. That opinion still leaves
issues unsolved and in need of clarification,
Hasen said.
At IU-Indianapolis, Pitts notes the same and
recognizes Judge Posner's rationale, but
emphasizes the record is equally weak on
both sides of this case. While the plaintiffs
have been dogged with the inability to find
someone without an ID who wants to vote,
the state has also not been able to produce
evidence of voter fraud prosecutions.
The lack of evidence on either side may make
this a type of vehicle SCOTUS doesn't want
to touch, he said.
Pitts also points out that the party-line voting
in this case and the makeup of the nation's
high court could play a part in whether it's
accepted. He said that Justice Anthony
Kennedy-largely recognized as the swing
vote on the often-split court-could be the
deciding factor, especially because he hails
from the 7th Circuit.
Justice Kennedy has been in the majority in
all of the six 5-4 decisions issued this term.
Pitts said he is a likely target as he often sides
with how 7th Circuit Judge Woods in this
voter ID case.
Indiana has been a focus of election-related
rulings by the SCOTUS before, Pitts said.
Landmark Hoosier cases include Whitcomb v.
Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) that struck down
Marion County's disproportionate legislative
redistricting and Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S.
109 (1986), another case arising from a
challenge to the state reapportionment of
legislative districts in that it put Democrats at
a disadvantage.
Groth said he hopes a decision on voter ID
laws comes before the next presidential
election.
The Supreme Court could wait for more of
these cases to percolate through the courts,
Groth said, but we think it's important they
address this issue prior to the 2008 election to
give some guidance so we don't end up with
another Bush v. Gore.
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"No Court Consensus on
Voter ID Laws"
USA Today
January 24, 2007
Joan Biskupic
Voter identification laws, adopted by states
in recent years amid concerns about fraud,
are getting mixed reviews as courts weigh
whether they unconstitutionally keep some
people from the polls.
State courts in Georgia and Missouri last fall
invalidated laws that required voters to show
photo ID each time they cast ballots.
Georgia and Missouri are among 11 states
that have passed such laws since 2003,
inspired partly by allegations of voter fraud
raised in Florida and elsewhere during the
2000 elections.
The Georgia law, blocked by federal and
state judges, required people to show one of
six government-issued forms of photo
identification, such as a driver's license or
passport. In the most recent challenge to the
law, brought by voters who said they
couldn't cast ballots because they did not
have photo IDs, a judge ruled in September
that Georgia's requirement put an
unconstitutional condition on voting.
Previously, state polling places had long
accepted utility bills, bank statements and
other types of non-photo ID as proof of
residency.
In October, Missouri's Supreme Court
struck down the state's requirement that
registered voters show a state or federal
photo ID to cast a ballot.
The judges said the law was an illegal hurdle
for poor, elderly and disabled residents.
Elsewhere, however, federal appeals courts
have not been as willing to reject voter ID
laws.
On Jan. 4, a three-judge panel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit upheld
Indiana's law requiring voters show photo
ID in each election. Voting 2-1, the panel
rejected claims by the state Democratic
Party and others that the law violates the
voting rights of those without easy access to
such IDs.
Even as they upheld Indiana's law, Judge
Richard Posner, joined by Judge Diane
Sykes, cited the politics surrounding voter
ID laws. "Most people who don't have
photo ID are low on the economic ladder
and . . . are more likely to vote for
Democratic than Republican candidates,"
Posner wrote. He noted, however, that it's
difficult to maneuver today without a photo
ID and that "the vast majority of adults"
have one.
Dissenting Judge Terence Evans sharply
criticized the law: "Let's not beat around the
bush: The Indiana voter photo ID law is a
not-too-thinly-veiled attempt to discourage
Election Day turnout by certain folks
believed to skew Democratic."
Meanwhile, a three-judge panel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit has
expressed skepticism about arguments that
Arizona s voter ID law should be thrown
out. The Arizona law is widely viewed as
the nation's strictest because it requires
voters to prove they are not just state
residents, but also U.S. citizens.
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Thomas Hudson, attorney for a group of
challengers, told the appeals panel Jan. 8
that the law is like a poll tax because of the
cost to Native Americans and others who
may have difficulty obtaining birth
certificates, passports or other documents to
prove citizenship. The judges, who have not
issued an opinion in the case, asked for
evidence of the law's impact-including
whether there was any record of how many
Native Americans did not have IDs that
would prove citizenship.
Hudson said he believed "thousands" of
Native Americans could be affected but
acknowledged that specific evidence had not
been gathered. The 9th Circuit judges
suggested by their questions that they would
return the case to a trial court to get such
answers.
"Much of the future litigation will be about
finding' r6al people who are adversely
affected" by ID policies, says Richard
Hasen, a professor at Loyola Law School in
Los Angeles who specializes in election law.
He adds, however, "There is not yet very
good empirical evidence" to support either
side: that many voters are being
disenfranchised by ID requirements or that
voter fraud is rampant.
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"Appeals Court Upholds Law Requiring
a Photo ID to Vote"
Los Angeles Times
January 5, 2007
Henry Weinstein
A sharply divided federal appeals court in
Chicago upheld an Indiana law Thursday
that requires individuals to produce a
government-issued photo identification card
to vote.
The court rejected a challenge filed by
Democrats and handicapped and homeless
people that the statute places an unfair
burden on voters.
The 2-1 decision by the U.S. 7th Circuit
Court of Appeals is the first ruling by a
federal appeals court upholding a statute
requiring voters to show photo ID.
Judge Richard Posner wrote for the majority
upholding the law, which is considered the
strictest in the nation. He acknowledged that
the law would "deter some people from
voting" and that such individuals were likely
to be poor and vote Democratic.
Nonetheless, Posner said, it was telling that
the plaintiffs had not produced one person
who would be prevented from voting by the
law.
Posner, an appointee of President Reagan,
said the law would discourage voter fraud,
which was difficult to detect and rarely
prosecuted. Judge Diane S. Sykes, an
appointee of President George W. Bush.
joined Posner's decision.
Judge Terence T. Evans, an appointee of
President Clinton, issued a tart dissent.
"Let's not beat around the bush: The Indiana
voter photo ID law is a not-too-thinly-veiled
attempt to discourage election-day turnout
by certain folks believed
Democratic," Evans wrote.
to skew
He continued: "The percentage of eligible
voters participating in elections has, for
many years, been on a downward trajectory.
With that being the case, one would think
states would be looking for creative
ways . . . to increase voter participation. Yet,
the Indiana law we sanction today does just
the opposite."
The majority upheld the ruling of U.S.
District Judge Sarah Evans Barker of
Indiana, who rejected a challenge to the law
last year.
Kenneth Falk, the American Civil Liberties
Union's head lawyer in Indiana, and
William Groth, the Indianapolis lawyer who
represented the Indiana Democratic Party in
the case, said they would seek a rehearing
from a larger panel of judges from the 7th
Circuit, which considers appeals of federal
cases from Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin.
The Indiana law was passed by a
Republican-dominated Legislature in 2005.
Indiana is one of more than a dozen states
that have sought to tighten voter laws since
the controversial 2000 presidential election:
As of the November 2006 election, 24 states
had enacted some form of voter
identification law, up from 11 in 2000,
according to the nonpartisan
ElectionLine.org. California is one of 24
states that require some kind of
identification for first-time voters who
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registered by mail and did not provide
identification when they registered.
State courts in Georgia and Missouri have
thrown out photo identification laws, saying
they violated state voting rights laws,
according to Ohio State University law
professor Dan Tokaji, an election law
expert.
In light of Thursday's ruling, Tokaji said,
lawyers filing cases of this kind in the future
"would do well to have a large number of
plaintiffs who have been obstructed from
voting as a result of the law."
Los Angeles' Loyola Law School professor
Richard Hasen said he was "not surprised"
by the decision because the Indiana statute
has a specific provision that allows poor
people to obtain a government-issued photo
identification if they can't afford a car and
therefore don't have a driver's license-a
provision of the law highlighted by Posner
in the majority opinion.
But Evans said there was no evidence of
voter fraud in the case record.
"At oral argument, the defenders of this law
candidly acknowledged that no one in the
history of Indiana had ever been charged
with violating" the state law against voter
fraud, Evans said.
In September, the U.S. House of
Representatives passed a bill requiring
voters to present government-issued photo
identification at polling places in 2008 and
proof of citizenship by 2010. But the
measure did not clear the Senate, and it is
considered dead because of the Democratic
takeover of Congress.
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"Democrats Predict Voter ID Problems"
The Washington Post
November 3, 2006
Amy Goldstein
On Indiana's primary day, Rep. Julia Carson
shoved her congressional identification card
in a pocket, ran out of her house and raced
down the street to be at her polling site when
it opened at 6 a.m. The Democrat, seeking to
represent Indianapolis for a sixth term,
showed the card to a poll worker, who told
her it was unacceptable under a new state
law that requires every voter to show proof
of identity.
The law compels voters to show an ID,
issued by Indiana or the federal government,
with a photograph and an expiration date.
Carson's card was for the 109th Congress,
but did not say when the session ends. "I just
thought I was carrying the right thing-if
you have a card that has a picture and shows
it is current," she said.
In the end, the poll worker telephoned a
boss, and Carson was allowed to vote for
herself in the five-way primary. But her
close call in the light turnout of the May
primary, she and other Democrats say,
foreshadows turmoil and votes that are not
counted when the nation goes to the polls for
Tuesday's midterm elections.
Indiana will have the country's strictest
voter identification law in effect on Election
Day. The 2005 picture ID law, however,
puts it among a dozen states that have
tightened requirements lately that voters
display some form of identification at the
polls. The laws have spawned partisan
warring, lawsuits and confusion that election
experts predict could influence the outcome
of some close elections.
In the Washington area, Virginia requires all
voters to show identification, although it
does not need to have a picture. Maryland
and the District require first-time voters who
registered by mail to bring identification,
such as a driver's license or utility bill, to
the polls.
While the local laws have not been
challenged, new voter ID laws nationally are
the most widespread, and most bitterly
disputed, of several types of voting
procedures that states have adopted after the
chaotic 2000 presidential election. The
procedures include statewide electronic
databases of registered voters, which critics
allege have in a few states improperly
knocked out eligible people. In another
procedure. Ohio and Florida-battleground
states that have produced recent contested
elections-have placed tighter reins on
groups that work to register new voters.
Such rules, together with updated voting-
machine technology, were touted as means
to modernize and bolster public confidence
in the election system. They have quickly
led to new struggles over voting rights.
Republicans and their allies assert that the
identification requirements and other rules
w\ill lessen voting fraud. Democrats and
their supporters contend the changes are
ploys to suppress voting among poor,
elderly. minority and disabled citizens, who
are prone to support Democratic candidates.
"We believe photo ID is the kind of
confidence-building measure that is
warranted in light of past fraud," said Mark
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"Thor" Hearne, the chief election lawyer for
the 2004 Bush campaign and now counsel to
the American Center for Voting Rights, a
conservative advocacy group. He predicted
the identification laws will prompt higher
turnout.
Mary G. Wilson, national president of the
League of Women Voters, said
identification laws, particularly ones
requiring photo IDs, are "odious" and
added: "There is very little evidence there's
been any kind of voting by people who are
ineligible to vote. We view this as basically
another unnecessary hurdle voters are being
put through."
Tuesday's election will be "a laboratory of
democracy," providing the first major test of
which view is right, said Doug Chapin,
director of Electionline.org, a nonpartisan
project that tracks election reform.
In 2002, as Congress debated how to
respond to the disputed presidential election
two years earlier, lawmakers disagreed over
how much to make voters prove who they
are. In the end, the Help America Vote Act
requires first-time voters who register by
mail without an ID to bring identification to
the polls. Nearly half the states have tougher
laws.
Missouri and Georgia have adopted photo
identification laws similar to Indiana's,
although Missouri's has been struck down as
unconstitutional and a federal court has
halted the Georgia requirements while a
lawsuit is underway.
In Arizona. voters are required to bring
some form of ID and proof of citizenship.
The requirement is being challenged in
federal courts, but the Supreme Court
stepped in two weeks ago to say that IDs
could be required in Tuesday's election
before the lawsuits are resolved. The
situation has been in even greater flux in
Ohio, where opponents of a new ID law
sued last week over whether voters using
absentee ballots must supply an
identification number. Ohio courts flip-
flopped on the question before the parties
reached a settlement late Wednesday that
exempts absentee ballots from the state's ID
law for Tuesday's election only.
Indiana's law is also being challenged, by
the Indiana Democratic Party and the state
chapter of the American Civil Liberties
Union; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th
Circuit has indicated it will not decide
before Election Day whether to uphold a
lower-court ruling that it is constitutional.
Indiana's secretary of state, Todd Rokita, a
Republican who made photo IDs part of his
platform when he ran for the office, said
photo IDs give "a measure of integrity" to
an election system that had been continually
expanding access to voting since the mid-
1960s.
He said that, based on the primary in which
Carson's congressional ID card was
challenged and a few local special elections,
the law "is going very, very well." His office
is spending $2 million in federal and state
money on advertising about the
requirements, including ads targeting bus
passengers who do not have cars or driver's
licenses.
The law enables people without a driver's
license to get a free state ID at Bureau of
Motor Vehicle branches. But first they need
an official birth certificate and other
documents, and some Hoosiers are
discovering it is difficult to get one in time.
Jowana Peterson, 51, of Indianapolis lost her
wallet with her license inside a few weeks
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ago. When she went to replace it, she
brought a copy of her birth certificate from
Chicago, her Social Security card, her ID
card from her job as a financial planner and
four utility bills. "They turned me out cold,"
she said, telling her she needed a new birth
certificate from Cook County. She has
applied, but it has not yet arrived. Because
she had signed up to work at the polls on
Election Day, she was eligible to get an
absentee ballot, but she worries about other
would-be voters who cannot get one-or do
not know to ask.
Even so, she says, "I feel pretty cheated. I
am an American citizen. I've paid my taxes.
I feel the system kind of let me down. It
shouldn't be that hard."
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